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COMES NOW the Appellant, Jeremy C. Ewing, by and through his attorney of record,
CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN of the law firm of Clark and Feeney, and responds to the State's brief.

III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Ewing was driving in Lewiston on March 16, 2014, at which time he was stopped for
the DUI. His Administrative License Suspension hearing was held April 10, 2014. State v. Besaw,
155 Idaho 134,306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App.2013) was issued by the Court of Appeals on June 21, 2013.

On July 3, 2014, Judge Stegner issued his ruling in State v. Nauert, Kootenai County Case No. CR
2013-10176. On August 20, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Haynes, No.
41924-2014, 2015 WL 4940664, Opinion 80, from a February 23, 2013 DUI stop. On August 24,
2015, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Riendeau, Docket No. 41982-2014,
Opinion No. 8 from a March 21, 2013, DUI stop. Besaw was issued before Mr. Ewing's ALS hearing
but State v. Nauert, State v. Haynes, and State v. Riendeau, are all cases that developed the issue of
the Standard Operating Procedures (hereinafter referred to as: "SOPs") and rule-making after Mr.
Ewing's ALS hearing. The Supreme Court ultimately determined that the 2013 SOPs were void for
lack of rule-making. The State in Nauert has filed a motion with the Supreme Court to dismiss the
State's appeal of Judge Stegner's findings that the SOPs are invalid and that the ISP had over
stepped its authority regarding the foundation require for evidence admitted in courts.
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The District Court in Ewing did not have the benefit of the Haynes or Riendeau decisions
with regard to its analysis of LC. §67-5279(3) issues and the use by the ALS hearing officer of the
2013 SOPs as a basis for license a suspension. The 2013 SOPs would have been in effect at the time
of Mr. Ewing's DUI stop and ALS hearing. Rule-making did not take place pursuant to the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act (IAP A) until October 22, 2014. The Court can review IDAP A Rule
11.03.01 for September 2014, a copy of which is attached as Appendix 1.

IV.
ARGUMENT
THE IDAHO STATE POLICE STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURE FOR BREATH TESTING IS VOID,
THEREFORE MR. EWING'S BREATH TEST IS INVALID
FOR THE PURPOSE OF LICENSE SUSPENSION.
In Bobeckv. Idaho Transportation Department, Docket No. 42682, 2015 Opinion No. 5, the
Court of Appeals noted:
This Court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed
the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision
must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in LC. § 67-5279(3)
and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. (Cites omitted)
Opinion, pp.3-4
The Idaho Transportation Department (hereinafter referred to as: "ITD") violated the
provisions of LC. §67-5279(3) by sustaining Mr. Ewing's license suspension based on the SOPS that
were in effect at the time of Mr. Ewing's DUI stop in 2014. There were no adequate administrative
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rules regarding breath testing pursuant to LC. § 18-8004(4) and I.C. § 18-8002A(3) in effect in 2013,
as a result, ITD's statutory authority to suspend licenses was exceeded.
The findings, inferences, conclusions and decisions of the Ewing hearing officer were made
upon an unlawful procedure in that ITD used void SOPs as a basis to make the finding that the breath
test was done pursuant to Idaho Code.
Finally, the ALS decision is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because the ALS
hearing officers were required to use valid rules for breath testing while ISPFS was required to
produce valid rules for breath testing.
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Riendeau, No. 41982-2014, Opinion No. 81, notes: in

State v. Haynes, No. 41924-2014, 2015 WL 4940664 (Idaho Aug. 20, 2015), this Court held that the
2013 SOPs were void because they were not adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
Opinion, p. 5.

Ewing is not a case in which an expert testified that the breath testing was accurate. The
hearing officer relied on the SOPs. R. at p. 286 1• The SOPs were challenged at the time of the ALS
Hearing. Tr. pp. 18-21, Rat p. 350-353. The hearing officer specifically noted in his Amended
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law as follows:
Mr. Stroschein argued the following on behalf of Ewing: ... 4. The breath testing
was not conducted within the requirements of Idaho Code, §18-8004(4), IDAPA
Rules 11.03.01, et seq, and the recent Besaw decision.

1

"9. Ewing's evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Law and ISP Standard Operating

Procedures.
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Rat p. 282.
I.C. § l 8-8002A(7)(d) states specifically:
The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance
with the requirements of section 18-8004(4 ), Idaho Code ...
The issue of the SOPs was challenged at the time of the ALS hearing. The SOPs were
challenged on judicial review and the SOPs have been challenged in this appeal as a basis for
supporting the breath test.
Please also note the emails from ISPFS. R. at pp. 98 - 250. One would have to wonder
exactly what expert would be called in the State ofldaho to save breath-testing. Is the Court going
to rely on Jeremy Johnston as an expert considering his statements in the emails?
The decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court in Riendeau and Haynes follow Mr. Ewing's
argument regarding the SOPs and the lack of rule-making.

Mr. Ewing's case is a 2014

Administrative License Suspension. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the 2013 SOPs used in
Mr. Ewing's case are void.
Under Idaho Law, in order to have the force and effect oflaw, an agency action characterized
as a rule must be promulgated according to statutory directives for rule-making. See I.C. §67-5231
(declaring rules invalid unless adopted in substantial compliance with the requirements of IAP A).
Therefore, in the absence of evidence of substantial compliance with rule-making procedures, this
Court must decide that the SOPs are void and thus, do not have the full force and effect of law. If
the SOP for breath-testing does not have the full force and effect of law it cannot be the basis for
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ITD's action to suspend driving privileges. Any agency actions resting on the 2013 SOP for breath
alcohol testing must be set aside.
Please recollect that Mr. Ewing has a valuable property right in his driver's license. In Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the Court stated:
"Once licenses are issued, ... their continued possession may become essential in the
pursuit of a live] ihood. Suspension of issued licenses ... involves State actions that
adjudicates important interest of the licensee. In such cases the licenses are not to be
taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourth Amendment."
At p. 539.
The Idaho Supreme Court did not have the benefit of the emails that are part of this record.
The emails show the frivolous nature ofISPFS's attempt at thwarting valid challenges to breath
testing. See SOPs changes from January 7, 2015; January 8, 2015; and February 13, 2015.

The

SOPs have been dumbed-down and continue to be dumbed-down for no scientific purpose. The only
purpose for the changes to the SOP is to convict people of DUis and have their licenses suspended
in Administrative License Suspension matters.
ISP Forensic Services and the ITD have been on notice for a number of years that the SOPs
were suspect but neither State agency took any action to follow rule-making until Judge Stegner
issued his ground-breaking decision in State v. Nauert, Kootenai County Case No. CR 2013-10176,
Supreme Court Docket No. 0042441-2014. Finally, a District Judge said enough was enough.
The Idaho Supreme Court made the determination that the SOPs are void. As a result, Mr.
Ewing's license suspension must be vacated. It is clear the hearing officer made his decision based
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on the SOPs and not expert testimony. Mr. Ewing has met his burden of proof, pursuant to LC. §675279(3) and LC. § l 8-8002A(7)(d).
One wonders why the State doesn't concede the point by simply doing what the State did in

State v. Victor Smith, 127 Idaho 77, 813 P.2d 888 (1991 ). The State, at the time of Smith, conceded
that the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act was unconstitutional and informed Counsel of that decision
prior to oral argument. The State then acknowledge the statute was unconstitutional at the time of
oral argument. The State in its Briefing should concede that Mr. Ewing's license suspension should
be vacated.
The State may argue that the hearing officer's decision in 2014 should not be effected by the
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in 2015. However, this position would be contrary to prior
holdings of Idaho appellate courts. The Court can look at Gay v. County Cornmissioners of

Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 651 P .2d 560 (Idaho App. 1982) in which the Court of Appeals
discussed the issue of standard of review. A copy of the case is attached as Appendix 2 for the
Court's ease ofreference. The Court noted that the District Court followed what had been a wellestablished line ofldaho decisions but that the well-established line of decisions was changed during
the pendency of the appeal by the Idaho Supreme in its decision in Cooper v. Board of County

Cornm 'rs ofAda County, l O1 Idaho 407, 614 P .2d 94 7 ( 1980). The Court in Gay noted that Cooper
has fundamentally altered our perspective on the proper standard of judicial review. The Court then
analyzed how this change should be applied to other cases. The Gay Court noted: "There are no
constitutional limitations upon a court's choice to give either retroactive or prospective effect to a
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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decision altering a prior rule of law. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731,14, L.Ed.2d
601 (1965)". Gay, 103 Idaho at 630,651 P.2d 564. The Court went on to note that the "pipeline

approach" was the appropriate approach in applying a new rule on similar cases pending when the
new rule was announced.
The Court can look at the language from the Cooper decision:
"It is clear there is a pressing need in Idaho for established standards and procedures
by which particularized land use regulation is to be administered. To allow the
discretion of local zoning bodies to remain virtually unlimited in the determination
of individual rights is to condone government by men rather than government by
law."

Cooper, 101 Idaho at 411,614 P.2d at 951
The above quote is extremely relevant to issue of ISP Forensic Services and the way it has
handled breath testing for alcohol in the State of Idaho. It has been Jeremy Johnston and his cohorts
at ISP using "·weasel words" rather than government by law in breath testing. Since the Ewing
matter was in the "pipeline", the decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court in Haynes and Riendeau,
should be applied to vacate Mr. Ewing's license suspension. The 2013 SOPs were void, therefore
there were no rules for breath-testing. Mr. Ewing's 2014 breath test was invalid.
The State may argue that the Supreme Court did not grant Ms. Haynes Motion in Limine
even though the Court found the ISP breath alcohol testing standards were void. In the DUI case the
State had the ability to bring in an expert to testify at the time of the DUI trial. In the ALS hearing
was no expert. The State did not bring an expert to Ewing's ALS hearing; the State just relied on
the SOPs. The Court in Haynes stated as follows:
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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The State does not contend that the 2013 SOPs were adopted m substantial
compliance with the Act. Therefore, they are void.
However, "[ s]howing that the test was administered in conformity with applicable
test procedures or expert testimony may suffice to establish an adequate foundation."
Dach/et v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 757, 40 P.3d 110, 115 (2002). Therefore, the fact
that the 2013 SOPs are void would not have prevented the State from establishing an
adequate foundation for the admissibility of the test results. As stated above, the
magistrate court ruled that the State would have to establish that the test was
accurate. That could be done by expert testimony. Because Ms. Haynes pled guilty
prior to trial, the magistrate court never had to determine whether the State could
present sufficient evidence to establish that foundation. The district court did not err
in holding that the magistrate did not err in denying the motion in limine.
Opinion at p. 11
There is a vast difference between what happened at the DUI Motion in Limine and the
request that hearing officer find that the SOPs were invalid for purposes of breath testing. The
hearing officer didn't suspend the hearing for the benefit of bringing in an expert when the challenge
was made to the SOPs. The State's reliance on the fact that Ms. Haynes' Motion in Limine wasn't
granted is of no effect in this case.
The State may argue that the Supreme Court and the State of Idaho, in both Haynes and
Riendeau, didn't go far enough regarding the argument of trying to adopt rules for breath testing.
There are two Supreme Court decisions that the Cow1 of Appeals can't overturn. The fact is that
the 2013 SOPs, and all SOPs for that matter, are void. The breath testing rules set out in the newly
adopted IDAP A rules are the only things that can be applied to support the foundation for breath test
results based upon LC. §18-8004(4) and LC. §18-8002A(3).
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The State may argue that ISP Forensic Services properly adopted breath alcohol testing
"rules" pursuant to prior IDAPA Rule 11.03.11.014.03.2 The fact that ISP Forensic Services went
forward with rule-making in 2014 seems to counter the logic expressed by State.
The State may want the Court to only rely on its interpretation of LC.§ 18-8004(4) regarding
the use of the SOP . However this is an ALS matter. LC. § l 8-8002A(3) states:
Rulemaking authority of the Idaho state police. The Idaho state police may, pursuant
to chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, prescribe by rule:
(a) What testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under this
section; and
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to
comply with the department's requirements. Any rules of the Idaho state
police shall be in accordance with the following: a test for alcohol
concentration in breath as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and
subsection (l)(e) of this section will be valid for the purposes of this section
if the breath alcohol testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho
state police in accordance with section 18-8004, Idaho Code, at any time
within ninety (90) days before the evidentiary testing. A test for alcohol
concentration in blood or urine as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code,
that is reported by the Idaho state police or by any laboratory approved by the
Idaho state police to perform this test will be valid for the purposes of this
section.
The ALS Statute is specific to rule-making. The legislature was specific that the Idaho State
Police needed to prescribe by rule the matters noted above. The State can't get around this
legislation despite its attempt to play games with the two decisions ofidaho Supreme Court: Haynes
and Riendeau. ISP Forensic Services "rules" for breath-testing took effect in October of2014 and

2 Breath tests shall be administered in confonnity with standards established by the Department. Standards
shall be developed for each type of breath testing instrument used in Idaho, and such standards shall be issued in the
fonn of analytical methods and standard operating procedures.
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the legislature has made no attempt to change either I.C. § 18-8002A or I.C. § 18-8004(4) based upon
appellate decisions starting with Besmr. One would have to assume that if the legislature had a
problem with the Court decisions, the legislature would have moved to change the statutory scheme.
In Nauert, Judge Stegner challenged the ability ofISP to usurp the powers of the court with regard
to evidentiary requirements. A copy of the Judge Stegner's decision is attached as Appendix 3 for
the Court's convenience.
A argument may be raised that somehow the Supreme Court, in Haynes and Riendeau,
missed the distinction between "rules" and "standards". However, this argument doesn't seem to
be supported by the Court's language in the Haynes case:
A "rule" under the Administrative Procedure Act is "the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general applicability that has been promulgated in compliance with the
provisions of this chapter and that implements, interprets, or prescribes: (a) Law or
policy; or (b) The procedure or practice requirements of an agency." LC. § 675201 (19). The approval and certification standards would constitute a rule under the
Act. If they are not adopted in compliance with the Act, they are "voidable unless
adopted in substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter," LC.§ 675231 (1).
At p. 10.

It would be hard to believe that the Idaho Supreme Court would not have been aware of LC.
§67-5201(21).
To finally put to rest this issue that the Supreme Court in Haynes got it wrong, the Court can
look at the briefing filed by the State in Haynes. Pertinent sections of the Respondent's Brief filed
by the Paul R. Panther and Lori A. Fleming are attached hereto as Appendix 4. The State devoted
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17 pages of argument in an attempt to convince the Court that the SOPs weren't rules, but standards.
In Haynes the State seems to argue that Ms. Haynes had to file some kind ofrequcst for declaratory
judgment to overturn the SOPs. Obviously, the Supreme Court did not think much of the State's
argument. The Court of Appeals should not think much of the State's argument in Mr. Ewing's case.
The State in its Respondent's Brief states as follows:

Mr. Ewing raises no challenge to the Hearing Examiner's decision that Mr. Ewing
has failed to meet his burden pursuant to LC.§ 18-8002A(7)(a-c) and (e). Any issue
that could have been raised pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A(7) has been waived. Kugler
v. Drowns, 119 Idaho 687,809 P.2d 1116(1991), Wheeler v. JTD, 148 Idaho 378,
223 P .3d 761 (Ct. App. 2009). However, Mr. Ewing did not raise any LC. § l 88002A(7) issues before the Hearing Examiner.
Respondent's Brief, p. 3
Clearly, Mr. Ewing raised an LC. § 18-8002A(7)(d) issue as the breath test wasn't
administered in accordance with the requirements of LC.§ 18-8004(4). The Transcript sets out the
argument, the hearing officer notes the argument in his decision. The State tries to mislead the
Court.
Mr. Ewing has met his burden of proof regarding the foundation for breath testing - No SOPs,
No valid breath test - No license suspension.
The State ofldaho, in State v. Nauert, Supreme Court Case No. 42441, has filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal. One would have to believe that the Attorney General's Office has determined
that the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions in Haynes and Riendeau were correct and there is no
reason to continue a losing argument in State v. Nauert. A copy of the motion is attached as
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Appendix 5.
Obviously the Supreme Court determined that there is no meaningful distinction between
rules and standards in the context of \vhether something promulgated by an executive agency can be
treated as the law. So long as whatever it is claims the ability to affect the lives of citizens, the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act must be followed. It is a simple concept that is clearly expressed
in the fact that the State of Idaho has moved to dismiss its appeal in Nauert.
At this point in time, the Court may want to consider the frivolous nature of ITD's attempt
to continue this appeal process. Although attorney fees weren't requested below or in the initial
briefing, one would have to believe because of the case law that has developed, the State should
simply do as the Deputy Attorney General is doing in State v. Nauert, and agree that the SOPs are
void. There was no expert testimony to save the breath test, therefore, the breath tests are invalid
and the license suspensions should be vacated. The Court can use I.C. § 12-117 in the award of
attorney fees to Mr. Ewing. The State is continuing the appeal process despite the overwhelming
authority that Mr. Ewing was correct in his position that the SOPs were void and that the State did
not pursue rule-making. As a result, the foundation for the breath test is not found on this record and
the license suspension is invalid. The Court is aware that this is an administrative proceeding
involving a State agency.

THERE IS NO DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARINGS.
The State, in its brief cites the Court to cases that aren't specific to a Driver's license
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suspension. Mr Ewing cites the Court to a United States Supreme Court decision that is specific to
license suspensions. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, (1977). The U.S.
Supreme Court in 1vfackey v. Monrrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed2d 321, (1979) stated:
Here, as in Love, the private interest affected is the granted license to operate a motor
vehicle. More particularly, the driver's interest is in continued possession and use of
his license pending the outcome of the hearing due him. As we recognized in Love,
that interest is a substantial one, for the Commonwealth will not be able to make a
driver whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by
reason of any delay in redressing an erroneous suspension through post-suspension
review procedures. 431 U.S. at 113. 97 S. Ct. at 1728. (emphasis added)

Nfackey at p. 11
The State cited to Federal Deposit Ins. Corp v. Aiallen, 486 U.S. 230, l 08 S.Ct. 1780, 100
L.Ed.2d 265 (1988). The State fails to mention the fact pattern found in the },/fallen case. Mr.
Mallen was indicted by a federal grand jury in the North District of Iowa. He was charged with
making false statements to the FDIC in violation of 18 USC § 101 and was making false statements
to the Farmers State Bank with the purpose of influencing the actions of the FDIC in violation of 18
USC § 1014. While Mr. Ewing plead to a $300.00 inattentive driving charge in State of Idaho v.

Jeremy C. Ewing, Nez Perce County Case No. CR 2014-2048. In the },fallen case there was federal
legislation that required a hearing to be held within thirty (30) days of a request for hearing and
required that the suspended bank officer have the decision within sixty (60) days of the hearing.
Thus, at a maximum, the suspended officer received the decision within ninety days of his or her
request for hearing.

The Supreme Court in the Mallen case focused on whether the federal

legislation protected the bank officer's constitutional rights and the right of the State to protect the
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interests of depositors and maintain the public confidence in the banking institution. The Court
found that the congressional legislation provided the necessary safeguards for the individual who had

a protected right.

In Mr. Ewing's case, the statute involved is I.C. §18-8002A. The legislature, obviously being
involved in the protection ofldaho roadways, determined due process was satisfied as follows: "If

a hearing is requested, the hearing shall be held vvithin 20 days of the date the hearing request was
received by the department unless this period is, for good cause shown, extended by the hearing
officer for one ten day period." I.C. § l 8-8002A(7)
Mr. Ewing's opening brief sets out the time-frames involved in what happened in his case.
There was no good cause shown for the ALS hearing being held outside the statutory time of 20
days. Obviously, the legislature knew, when it set the statutory time frame, that a hearing officer
would have the authority to administer oaths, examine witnesses and take testimony, issue subpoenas
and the like. For the State to argue that it was somehow Mr. Ewing's fault for having a hearing
officer issue subpoenas is ridiculous. Please recall that without at least some ability to examine what
the State did, there wouldn't be any meaningful hearing within an appropriate time frame which is
required in post suspension hearings.
Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hoglancl, 14 7 Idaho 774, 215 P .3d 494 (2009) is a case cited

by the State. The Comi in Hogland specifically notes: BTA's argument that it was entitled to a
pre-deprivation hearing before the stop-work order was issued fails under the A1athews balancing
test. We are not dealing with a request for pre-deprivation hearing in Mr. Ewing's case. Also, the
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Court in Hogland was not certain that BTA had a constitutionally protected property right in its

building permit.
The State cites the Court to cases that aren't relevant to the issues before the Court in Mr.
Ewing's case. Due process was noted in the Dixon v. Love and Mackey decisions regarding the loss

of a Driver's license. The State can't make a driver whole for ill1Y delay in Mr. Ewing's case.
The State continues to make the odd statement that Mr. Ewing did not raise any LC. § 18-

8002(7) issues, but clearly Mr. Ewing did, as noted above and noted by the hearing officer's
decision. There was an erroneous deprivation of a property right in Mr. Ewing's administrative
license suspension case, his driver's license.

It is interesting that the State argued previously, that attachments to Mr. Ewing's opening
brief weren't part of the record. The State, in its Supplemental Brief in Gary Alexander Hern, vs.

State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 42287, attached
exhibits that weren't before the hearing officer or the district court. There was no motion to augment
the record in Hern as permitted by statute.
The State argues: "Finally, Mr. Ewing does not indicate that he suffered any actual harm or
that there was a violation of any fundamental right." Respondent's Brief, p. 17. One has to wonder
if the State actually read the opening brief of Mr. Ewing and the case law that notes that a right to
a driver's license is a fundamental right that due process applies to. The opening brief of Mr. Ewing
cites the Court to Federal and State case law that supports the position that the suspension of a motor
vehicle operator's license adjudicates important property interest of the licensee.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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The State once again points to "invited error" as a reason for the Court to disregard Mr.
Ewing's argument. Hmvever, the State doesn't note what facts apply to the Invited Error Doctrine
or how Mr. Ewing invited error. Mr. Ewing requested a hearing and requested subpoenas pursuant
to LC. § l 8-8002A, so how is that invited error? The hearing \Vas set for April 10, 2014. The license
suspension began on March 16, 2014, with a temporary license being good for thirty days or until
April 15, 2014. A stay of the suspension was not entered until April 16, 2015.
THE ACTIONS OF THE HEARING OFFICER
VIOLATE MR. EWING'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS.

With regard to the equal protection argument and the issue of the lack of performance
verification, the initial briefing filed by Mr. Ewing is sufficient as the argument made by the State
under its Issue 3 and Issue 4 is just a re-tread of prior arguments and really has no support in the law.
V.
CONCLUSION

The SOP is not a "rule" as there was no compliance with the process that is required in
making administrative rules. The Court must find that ISP Forensic Services has failed in its
statutory duties to set out administrative rules for breath alcohol testing in the State ofldaho. I.C.
§ l 8-8002A(7)(c), LC. § l 8-8002A(7)(d) and I.C. § 18-8004(4) allow for the attack of the breath test
result. There is no valid breath test.
The Court can also review LC. §67-5279(3) in that: for ITD to use the SOP, it would be a
violation of a constitutional or statutory provision and would be in excess of the statutory authority
of the agency, and therefore, would be an unlawful procedure. The use of the SOP would not be
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supported by substantial evidence and would be arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.
The Court is going to have to decide whether the process used now by ITD for fair postsuspension hearings is actually constitutional. ITD does not support a fair hearing for a driver. ITD
makes it as hard as possible for a driver to meet his burden.
Finally, there is no equal protection in these matters for drivers who request any sort of
subpoena or relevant evidence.
Since the hearing officer made no sort of record regarding "good cause" and didn't have a
hearing, the Court can also find that the decision to expand the hearing past the twenty (20) day limit
is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The Court can apply I.C. §675279(3).
The Court should find that the license suspension was improper and enter an order directing
ITD to vacate the license suspension for Mr. Ewing.
DATED this 23th day of October, 2015.
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP
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I hereby certify on the 23th
day of October, 2015, a true copy
of the foregoing instrument
was:
__.,, Mailed
Faxed
Hand delivered to:
Edwin L. Litteneker
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 321
Lewiston, ID 83501
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11.03.01 - RULES GOVERNING ALCOHOL TESTING

000.
LEGAL AUTHORITY.
The Dir.!clor of the Idaho State Police has general ru!emaking authority to prescribe rules and reguiatlons for alcohol
{4-7- ! l)
testing, pursuam to Section 67-290 I. Idaho Code.

001.

TITLE ANO SCOPE.
01.

Title. These rules shall be ci'.cd as IDAPA I 1.03.01. "Rules Governing Alcohoi Testing." (4-7-1 !)

02.

Scope. The rules relate to th:: govem::rncc and operation of the Alcohol Testing Program. (4-7-11)

002.
\VRITTEN INTERPRET ATIO NS.
There arc no written interpretations of this rule.

(4-7-ll)

003.
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS.
There is no provision for administrative appeals before the Idaho State Police under this chapter.

(4-7-11)

004.
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE.
The following are incorporated by reference in this chapter of rules:

(4-7-11)

01.
Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Measurement Devices {revised 3/11/2010).
This document is available on the internet at http://edocketaccess.gpo.gov!20 I 0.1pdf/20 I 0-5242.pdL
( 4-7-11)

005.
MAILING ADDRESS AND OFFICE HOURS.
The mailing address is Idaho State Police, Forensic Services, 700 S. Stratford Drive Suite 125, Meridian, ID 836426206. Lobby hours arc Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. lo 5:00 p.m. exc.:pt holidays designated by the stale of Idaho.

(4-7-11)
006.
PUBLIC RECORDS AVAlLABILITY.
This rule is subject to and in compliance with the Public Records Act.

(4-7-11)

007.
WEBSITE.
Alcohol Testing infonnation is available on the internet at hHp:l/www.isp.idaho.goviforcnsicsfindcx.html.

( 4-7-11)

008. -009.
010.

(RESERVED)

DEFINITlONS AND ABBREVIATIONS.
01.

Alcohol. "Alcohol" shall mean the chemical compounds of ethyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, or

isopropyl alcohol.

02.

(9-2-l 4)T

Approved Vendor. "Approved vendor'' shall mean a source/provider/manufacturer of an approved
(9-2-14)T

standard.

03.
Blood Alcohol Analysis. "Biood alcohol analysis" shall mean 11.n analysis of blood to determine the
(7-1-93)
concentration of alcohol present,
04.
Breath Alcohol Analysis. "Brcalh alcohol analysis" shall mean an analys:s of breath to determine
(7-1-93)
the concentration of alcohol present.
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05.
Breath Alcohol Test. "Breath alcohol test" shall mean a breath sample or series of separate breath
samples provided during a breath testing sequence.
(9-2-!4)T
06.
Breath Alcohol Testing Sequence. "Brealh alcohol testing sequence" shall mean a sequence of
events as detennined by !he Idaho Stale Police Forensic Services, which may be directed by the instrument, the
Operator, or both, and may consist of air blanks, perfonnance verification, internal standard checks, and breath
samples.
(9·2-14)T
07.
Breath Testing Certification Class. "Breath testing certification class" shall mean a department
approved training class for prospective or uncertified breath alcohol Operators/Breath Testing Specialists. (9·2- l 4)T
08.
Breath Te5ting Specialist (BTS). "Breath Testing Specialist" shall mean an operator who has
completed advanced training approved by the department and are certified to perfonn routine instrument
maintenance, leach instrument operation skills, proctor proficiency tests for instrument Operators, and testifying as
an expert on alcohol physiology and instrument function in court.
(9-2-14)T
09.
Calibration. "Calibration" shall mean a set of laboratory operations which establish under
specified conditions, the relationship between values indicated by a measuring instrument or measuring system, or
values represented by a material, and the corresponding known values of a measurement.
(9-2- I4)T
10.
Certificate of Analysis. "Certificate of analysis" shall mean II certificate staling the standards used
for performance verification have been tested and approved for use by the ISPFS or are manufactured by an ISO
17025:2005 vendor and are traceable to N.I.S.T. standards.
(9-2-l4)T
11.
Certificate of Instrument Calibration. "Certificate of instrument calibration" shall mean a
certificale stating that an individual breath alcohol testing instrument has been evaluated by the ISPFS and found to
be suitable for forensic alcohol testing. The certificate bears the signature of the calibration analyst at Idaho State
Police Forensic Services, and the effective date of the instrument approval.
{9-2-l4)T
12.
Changeover Class. "Changeover class" shall mean a training class for currently certified
Operators during which the Operator is taught theory, operation, and proper testing procedure for a new make or
model of instrument being adopted by their agency. Breath Testing Specialists complete BTS training that qualifies
them lo perform BTS duties related to the new make or model instrument.
(9-2-14)T

13.

Department. "Department" shall mean the Idaho State Police.

(7-1-93)

14.
Evidentiary Test. "Evidentiary test" shall mean a blood, breath, or urine test perfonned on a
subject/individual for potential evidentiary or legal purposes. A distinction is made between evidentiary testing and
non-quantitative screening/monitoring.
(9-2-14)T
15.
Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS). "Idaho State Police Forensic Services" shall mean
a division of the Idaho State Police. ISPFS is dedicated to providing forensic science services to the criminal justice
system ofldaho. ISPFS is the administrative body for the blood and breath alcohol testing programs in Idaho.
(9-2-l4)T
16.
Laboratory. "Laboratory" shall mean the place at which specialized devices, instruments and
methods are used by trained personnel to measure the concentration of alcohol in samples of blood, vitreous humor,
urine, or beverages for law enforcement purposes.
(9-2-l4)T
17.
MIP/MIC. "MIP/M!C" shall mean an abbreviation used to designate minor in possession or minor
in consumption of alcohol.
(9-2-14)T

18.
Operator Certification. "Operator certification" shall mean the condition of having satisfied the
training requirements for administering breath alcohol tests as established by the department.
(9-2-14)T

19.
Section 010
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(9-2-l4)T

to adrninisier breath alcohol tests.

20.
Performance Verification. "Performance verification" shall mean a verification of the accuracy of
the breath testing instrument utilizing a perfonnance verification standard. Performance verification should be
reported to lhree decimal places. While ISPFS uses the term performance verification, manufacturers and others may
use a term such as "calibration check" or "simulator check."
(9·2-!4}T
21.
Performance Verification Standard. "Performance verification standard" shall mean an ethyl
alcohol standard used for field performance verifications. The standard is provided or approved, or both, by the
department.
(9-2-14)T
22.
Proficiency Testing. "Proficiency testing" shall mean a periodic analysis of blood, urine, or other
liquid specimen(s) whose alcohol content is unknown lo the testing laboratory, to evaluate the capability of that
laboratory to perform accurate analysis for alcohol concentration.
(9-2-14)T
23.
Quality Control. "Quality control" shall mean an analysis of referenced samples whose alcohol
content is known, which is performed with each batch of blood, vitreous humor, urine or beverage analysis to ensure
that the laboratory's determination of alcohol concentration is reproducible and accurate.
(9·2-14)T

24.
Recertification Class. "Recertification class" shall mean a training class offered by the department
for currently certified personnel, completion of which results in uninterrupted continuation of their BTO or BTS
status for an additional 2 years.
(9-2-14)T
25.
Urine Alcohol Analysis. "Urine alcohol analysis" shall mean an analysis of urine to determine the
concentration of alcohol present.
(7-1-93)
26.
Waiting Period/Monitoring Period/Deprivation Period/Observation Period. "Waiting Period/
Monitoring Period/Deprivation Period/Observation Period" shall mean individual titles used for the time period prior
to administering a breath alcohol test, in which an officer monitors the test subject/individual.
(9·2-14)T
011.

(RESERVED)

012.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

01.
Repeal of Prior Rules. All rules governing the Idaho State Forensic Laboratory are repealed,
specifically Idaho State Police Emergency Rules I 1.03.1, I 1.03.2, I 1.03.3, I J.03.4, I 1.03.5 and I 1.03.6.
(7-1-93)

02.
Continuation of Policies. All policies, training manuals, approvals of instruments, and/or
certifications of officers in effect when the alcohol program was managed by the Department of Health and Welfare
shall continue to be in effect in the Idaho Stale Police until the policy, training manual, approval and/or certification is
changed or deleted by the Idaho State Police.
(7-1-93)
013.

REQUIREMENTS FOR LABORATORY ALCOHOL ANALYSIS.

01.
Laboratory. Any laboratory desiring to perfonn urine alcohol, vitreous humor, blood alcohol, or
beverage analysis shall meet the following standards:
(9-2-14)T

a.
The laboratory shall prepare and maintain a written procedure governing its method of analysis,
including guidelines for quality control and proficiency testing. A copy of the procedure shall be provided to ISPFS
for initial approval. Whenever procedure, protocol, or method changes (however named) are adopted by a laboratory,
a copy of the update with the changes clearly indicated shall be approved by ISPFS before implementation;

(9-2-14)T
b.
The laboratory shall provide adequate facilities and space for the procedure used. The laboratory
alcohol related functions shall be subject to an assessment by either an accrediting body or the department each
calendar year, and the results from the annual audit shall be submitted to the department. The assessment shall be at
the expense of the laboratory;
(9-2- l 4)T
Section 011
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C~
Specin1,;;ns shall b~ n1aintained in a iimited ,1ccess ~nd secure storage area prior to anab;sis . .r\ chain
• (9-2-14)T
of custody shall be maintained while the cvidcn;;e is in the lnborntory;

,
d.
Ai! i;1s\mmenl?tion, equipm_ent, rc~i.::~11:s and .glassware necc5S<l~ for the perfonnu:1~e of the
cnosen prncedure shall oe on nand or readily avaaao!e on !nc laboratory premises. Instrument ma;ntemmce
documenlntion shall be available for rs:view by the departmer.t;
(9-2-i4)T
e.
The laboratory shall participate in approved proficiency testing and p.iss this proficiency testing
according to standards set bv the deoartment. Laboratories must particioate in pro!icicncv iesting from n department
approved provider at least once a caiencar yei!r. Approved prnviders inciude Nation2il Highwny T~ansport.ation Safety
Adminisiration (NHTSA) and Collaborntive Testing Services (CTS). Each test consists of at least four (4) blood
samples spiked with an unknown concentration of
I alcohol, and possibly other volatiles, for qualitative
determination. Participating laboratories must obtain
1cicncy tests from approved providcis and arc responsible
for all costs associated with obtaining and analyzing such tests. Results from proficiency tests must be submitted by
the due date to the test provider and ISPFS. Results not submitted to a test provider within the allowed time do not
qua!iry as a proficiency test. An alcohol concentration range is de!ennined from the target value and ±3.0 standard
deviations as provided by the proficiency test provider. Reported values must fall within this range. If a laboratory
determines more than one (I) alcohol value for a given sample, the mean value of results will be submitted and
evaluated. Upon sa!isfoctory completion of an approved proficiency test, a certificate of approval will be issued by
the department co lhe participating Jnboratory. Approval to perfonn legal blood alcohol determinations is continued
until the results of the next prnficiency test are reviewed and notification is sent to the respective laboratory by
ISPFS. Failure to pass a proficiency test shall resuh in immediate suspension of testing by an analyst or laboratory in
the form of a written inquiry from the department. The test is graded as a unsuccessful when the mean results are
outside the tolerance range estnblished from the accepted mean values. The laboratory shall have thirty (30) calendar
days to respond lo the department inquiry. The deportment shall notify the laboratory within fourteen (14) caiendar
days regarding corrective action steps necessnry to lift the testing suspension, or the department may issue a written
revocation. The department shall not lift a proficiency testing related suspension or revocation until a successful
(9-2-14)T
proficiency test has been completed by 1he individual analyst or laboratory.
f.
For n laboratory performing blood, urine, vftreous humor, or beverage analysis for alcohol,
approval shall be awarded to the lnborntory director or primary analyst responsible for that laboratory. The
responsibility for the correct perfom,ance of tests in that laboratory rests with that person; however, the duty of
perfonning such tests may be delegated to any person designated by such director or primary analyst. The department
may temporarily suspend or pcnnancntly revoke the approval of a laboratory or analyst if the listed requirements ore
not met. The department will issue the suspension or revocation in writing to the laboratory director or primary
nnalyst responsible;
(9-2-14)T

g.
Reinstatement after revocation requires completed corrective action of any items listed on the
revocation documentation issued by the depnnment. Documentation of corrective actions taken to address the
nonconfonnities shall be submitted to the department for review. Once the department is satisfied that the laboratory
is in compiiam:e with ali requirements, the department will issue written approval for the resumption of testing by
that laboratory or analyst. A laboratory may appeal a suspension or revocation to the Director of the depanmcnt.
(9-2-14)T
02.

Blood Collection. Blood collection shali be uccomplished ncco;ding to the following requirements:
{7-1-93)

a.
Blood samoles shall be col!ected using sterile, dry syringes and hypodermic needles, or other
(7-1-93)
equipment of equivalent steriiity;

b.
The skin at the area of puncture shall be cleansed thoroughly and disinfected with an aqueous
(7-1-93)
solution of a nonvolatile antiseptic. Alcohol or phenolic solutions shall not be used as a skin antiseptic;

c.
Blood specimens shall contain at least ten ( I0) milligrams of sodium fluoride per cubic centimeter
of blood plus an appropriate anticoagulant.
{4-4-13)
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03.
Blood Reported. The results of analysis 011 blood for alcohol com::ell!ration shall be reported in
units of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters of whole blood.
(9-2-14)T
04.

Urine Collection. Urine samples shall be collected in clean, dry containers.

(9-2-14)T

05.
Urine Reported. The results of analysis on urine for alcohol co11centratio11 shall be reported in
units of grams of alcohol per sixty-seven (67) mi!!iliters of urine. Results of alcohol analysis of urine specimens shaH
be accompanied by a warning statement about the questionable value of urine alcohol results.
(9-2-l4)T
06.
three (J) years.
014.

Records. All records regarding proficiency tests, quality control and results shall be retained for
(7-1-93)

REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFORMING BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING.

01.
Instruments. Each breath testing instrument model shall be approved by the department and shall
be listed in the "Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Measurement Devices" published in the Federal
Regisler by the United States Department of Transportation as incorporated by reference in Section 004 of this rule.
The department will maintain a list of benchlop and portable instruments approved for evidentiary testing use in
Idaho. Each individual breath testing instrument must be certified by the department. The department may, for cause,
remove a specific instrument by serial number from evidential testing and suspend or withdraw certification thereof.
(9-2-l4)T

02.
Report. Each direct breath testing instrument shall report alcohol concentration as grams of alcohol
per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath.
(7-1-93)

03.
Administration, Breath tests shall be administered in conformity wilh standards established by the
department. Standards shall be developed for each type of breath testing instrument used in Idaho, and such standards
shall be issued in the form of Idaho administrative rules, ISPFS analytical methods, and ISPFS standard operating
(9-2-14)T
procedures.
a.
The breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator (BTO or BTS) currently certified in the
use of the instrument.
(9-2-l4)T
b.
Prior to administering the observation period, any foreign objects/materials which have the
potential to enter the instrument/breath tube or may present a choking hazard should be removed. If a foreign object/
material (e.g. dental work, gum, chewing tobacco, food, piercing) is left in the mouth during the entirety of the fifteen
(15) minute monitoring period, any polential external alcohol contamination should not interfere with the results of
the subsequent breath alcohol tests.
(9-2-l4)T
c.
Prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, the subject/individual should be observed for fifteen (15}
minutes. The operator should be alert for any event that might influence the accuracy of the breath alcohol test.
During the observation period the subject/individual should not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or belch/burp/vomit/
regurgitate.
(9-2- l 4)T
d.
If mouth alcohol is suspected or indicated by the testing instrument, the operator should begin
another fifteen ( I 5) minute observation period before repeating the testing sequence. If during the observation period
the subject/individual vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into the breath pathway, the observation
period should start over. If there is doubt as to the events occurring during the observation period (e.g. silent burp,
belch, vomit, regurgitation), the officer should evaluate the instrument results for any indication of mouth alcohol.
(9-2-14)T
e.
A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken during the testing
procedure and preceded by air blanks. The subsequent breath samples performed with a portable breath testing
instrument should be approximately two (2) minutes apart or more. If the subject/individual fails or refuses to provide
n subsequent, adequate sample as requested by the operator, the single lest result shall be considered valid. lf only a
single test result is used, then a fifteen (15) minute observation period must be observed. For hygienic reasons, the
(9-2-l4)T
operator should use a new mouthpiece for each series of tests.
Section 012
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f.
The operator has the discretion to end breath testing, repeat breath testing, or request a blood draw
at any point during the testing process as !he circumslames require (including but not limited to lack of sample
correlation, fock of subject participation or cooperation, subject is incoherent or incapable of following instructions.
subject incapacitation). lfa subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a subsequent, adequate sample as requested
by the operator, lhe results obtained are still considered valid, provided the failure to supply the requested samples
was the fault of the subject/individual and not the operator.
(9-2-14}T
g.
A third breath sample should be collected if the first two (2) two results differ by more than 0.OZ g/
2lOL alcohol. Unless mouth alcohol is indicated or suspected, it is not necessary to repeat the observation period
prior to obtaining a third breath sample.
(9·2·14)T

h.
The results for subsequent breath samples should correlate within 0.02 g/2 l 0L alcohol to show
consistent sample delivery, indicate the absence of RF!, and to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the
subject/individual's brealh pathway as a contributing factor to the breath results.
(9·2· l 4)T
i.
In the event of an instrument failure, the operator should attempt to utilize another instrument or
have blood drawn.
(9-2-l4)T
04.
Training. Each individual operator (BTO or BTS) shall demonstrate sufficient training to operate
the instrument correctly. This shall be accomplished by successfully completing a training course approved by the
department on each instrument model utilized by the operator. Operator certifications issued after July I, 2013 are
valid for two (2) calendar years from the course completion date. The department may revoke individual operator
(BTO/BTS) certification for cause.
(9·2-14)T
05.
Performance Verification Checks. Each breath testing instrument shall be checked for accuracy
with a performance verification standard approved by the department. Performance verification checks shall be
perfonned according to a procedure established by the department and shall be documented. The official time and
date of the performance verification is the time and date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the
log.
(9·2·14)T

a.
A performance verification check shall occur within twenty-four (24) hours before or after an
evidentiary lest The benchtop instrument requires a perfonnance verification check as part of the testing sequence.
On the portable instrument, multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered by a single performance verification.
(9-2-14)T
b.
A performance verification 011 a portable instrument consists of two (2) samples at either the 0.08
or 0.20 level. Both samples must be run with the same performance verification standard. Three (3) attempts at
obtaining an acceptable perfonnance verification are allowed. Troubleshooting measures may be employed during
!his process. If the third performance verification fails, the instrument shall be taken out of service. The instrument
(9-2-I4)T
shall not be returned to service until it has been calibrated and certified by ISPFS.
c.
A performance verification acquired during a breath testing sequence on an approved benchtop
instrument consists of one (I) sample at either the 0.08 or 0.20 level. A performance verification acquired outside the
breath testing sequence on an approved benchtop instrument consists of two (2) samples at either the 0.08 or 0.20
level. Three (3) attempts at obtaining an acceptable performance verification are allowed. Troubleshooting measures
may be employed during this process. If the third perfonnance verification fails, the instrument must be taken out of
service. The instrument must not be returned to service until it has been calibrated and certified by lSPFS. (9-2-14)T
d.
lllrget value.

Perfonnance verification checks must be within +/- I0% of the performance verification standard
(9·2·14)T

e.
A wet bath 0.08 performance verification standard should be replaced with fresh standard
approximately every twenty-five (25) verifications or every calendar month, whichever comes first. For a closed
loop, recirculating system (e.g. the lntox 5000 series), the 0.08 performance verification standard should be replaced
with fresh standard approximately every one hundred ( I00) verifications or every calendar month, whichever comes
Section 012
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(9-2-14)T

first

f.
A wet bath 0.20 perfonnance verification standard should be replaced with fresh standard
approximately every twenty-five (25) verifications.
(9-2-14)T

g.
Ory gas performance verification standards may be used continuously without replacement until
the canister is spent or the expiration dale is reached.
(9-2- l 4)T
h.

Performance verification standards should not be used beyond the expiration daie.

(9-2-!4)T

i.
If Section l 8-8004C, Idaho Code, (excessive alcohol concentration) is applicable, then a 0.20
perfonnance verification mus! be run and results documenled once per calendar month. Failure to perform a 0.20
perfonnance verification will not invalidate any tests where Section 18-8004C, Idaho Code,_is not applicable. A
performance verification with a 0.20 standard does not need to be performed within twenty-four (24) hours of an
evidentiary breath test in excess of 0.20 g/21 OL alcohol.
(9-2- l 4)T
j.
Temperature of the wet bath simulator shall be between thirty-three point five degrees Celsius
(33.5"C) and thirty-four point five degrees Celsius (34.S 0 C} in order for the performance verification results to be
valid.
(9·2-14)T
k.

An agency may run additional performance verification standard levels at their discretion.
(9-2-14)T

06.
Records. Operators must document and retain test results (i.e. written log, printout, or electronic
database). All records regarding maintenance and results shall be retained for three (3) years. ISPFS is not responsible
for storage of documentation not generated by ISPFS.
(9-2-14)T

07.
Deficiencies. Failure to meet any of the conditions listed in Sections 013 and 014. Any laboratory
or breath testing instrument may be disapproved for failure to meet one ( l) or more of the requirements listed in
Sections 013 and 014, and approval may be withheld until the deficiency is corrected.
(4-7-I I)

08.
Standards. Premixed alcohol simulator solutions shall be from an approved vendor and explicitly
approved in writing by the department before distribution within Idaho. Dry gas standards from ISO 17025:2005
certified providers are explicitly approved by the department for use in Idaho without evaluation by the department.
(9·2-14)T
09.
MIP/MIC. The presence or absence of alcohol is the determining factor in the evidence in an MIP/
MIC case. The instrumentation used in obtaining the breath sample is often the same instrumentation utilized for
acquiring DUI evidence. The different standard of evidence requires different standards for the procedure. (9-2-l4)T

a.
Fifteen (15) minute observation period: The monitoring/observation period is not required for the
MIP/MIC procedure.
(9-2-l4)T

b.
instrument

The breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator currently certified in the use of that
(9-2-l4)T

c.
The instrument used must be certified by ISPFS. The instrument only needs to be initially certified
by ISPFS. Initial certification shows that the instrument responds to alcohols and not to acetone. The instrument does
not need to be checked regularly or periodically with any of the 0.08 or 0.20 standard.
(9-2-14)T

d.
The officer should have the individual being tested remove nil loose foreign material from their
mouth before testing. False teeth, Pl!riial plates, or bridges installed or prescribed by a dentist or physician do not
need to be removed to obtain a vahd test. The officer may allow the individual to briefly rinse their mouth out with
water prior to the breath testing. Any alcohol containing material left in the mouth during the entirety of the breath
test sampling could contribute to the results in the breath testing sequence.
(9-2-14)T

e.
Section 012

A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken from the subject and
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preceded by an air blank. Th~ subsequent breath sa,np1c;; do not need to be consecutive sarnples fron1 the SJn1e
subject. The individual br·=a!h samples should be approximately tv:o (2) minu!es apart or rnore. ,.1~ defici~nt or
insufficient san1p!e docs not automat!Caily invalidate a test sample. The operator should use a nc\v rnouthpiecc for
each individt:al.
(9-2-14)T
f,

A third breath sarnp!e is required if the first

t\VO

(2) results differ by more than 0.02 g/21 OL alcohoL

' tne
' even! tnot
' n1·; tnrcc
'
(-'
• Hh1
- II ou.tst:-1~
. "
•
.1 gr.!
,- 1• '"
1 h I
I
.
•
'.
•
••
. .
.,
111
..J) sampics
tn:;
u. 0'~:.
~~ a.C?t Ch corre1at1oy;, iHHJ ~esnng tn}::hcatcs or t!1c~
fl

officer suspects mouth alcohol, they n1ust aan11n1stcr a fittecn t l :>) rn,nute ooscrvatton period and tnen retest tnc
subject If mouth alcohol is not sesp~ctcd or indicated by the test results, then the officer may retest the subject
with'.lut administering an observation period.
(9-2- ! 4)T
g.

The operator should n:::rmully log test results nnd/cr retain printo,tts for possibk use in couri.
(9-2-14)T

h.

The instrumer!t rrn.Jst not be in passive mode for the testing of subjects for evidential purposes.
(9-2-14)T

i.
The passive mode of testing using the Lifeloc FC20 or ASIII should be used for testing liquids or
containers of liqJid for the presence or absence of n!cohol.
(9-2-14)T

015. - 999.

(RESERVED)

-------------~------------------------------·-~
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P.2d 560

\ alid. and thar tk scope of judicial

[651 P.2d

for capriciousne::;~, arbitra.rini;;:-;s
1· Blaine
506, 567 P2d 1257 (1977):

was limited to
John GAY and
Appellants,

his

Plaintiffs

and

Y.

COU'.'iTY CO:\I.\IISSIO'.'iERS OF BO.\;'.'iEVILLE
COlJ'.'iTY, and Simplot Soillmildcrs, Inc., Defendants
and Respondents.
;\'o.

e.g., DaHsm1 Entuprises, In,·.

discrimination.

Co11nr1·, 98 Idaho
Readr-to-Pour, Inc 1· .\le Cm, 95 Idaho 510. 511 P.2d 792
(1973). 1lowewr. during rhe pcndency of this appeal, our
Supreme Court issued ib decision in Cooper v. Board of
County Comm'r.1 o/Ada Count\. IOI Idaho 407, 614 P.2d
947 (] 9~0). Cooper has fundamentally altered our
pcrspecfr,e on the proper standard of judicial re\iew.

13647.

Cooper draws a distincrion between determination of

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

general zoning policies and the application of such policies

September 21, 1982

legislative, and the latter quasi-judicial. The Cooper opinion

to specific situations. The former function is deemed
treats the restricted standard of judicial review, employed
Petition for Review Denied NO\ 15. I 982.

by the district court and illustrakd by Dawson and
Ready-to-Pour, as a form of judicial defercuce to legislative

[651 P.2d 561J

action, This restrained standard of review is appropriate to
such
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John ::VI. Ohman, Cox. Ohman & Weinpcl, Idaho Falls. for
plaintiffs and appellants.

determinations

as

the

adoption

of

ordinances. In contrast,

a decision whether to rezone a

particular parcel of prope1ty is regarded by Cooper as
quasi-judicial, subject to due process protccrions. See also,

John D. Hansen and Michael R. Orme of Hansen.
Boyle, Beard & Martin,

legislative

comprehensive plans or the enactment of general zoning

Idaho Falls. for defendant

and

respondent, Simplot Soilbuildcrs. Inc.

e.g., Fasano \'. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington

County, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 ( 1973), owrruled on
other grounds, J\'euhcrgi!r r. Citr of Portland, 288 Or. 585,

607 P 2d 722 (1980)

BURNETT, Judge,
Although
The issue presented is whether procedural due process

the

county's

action

here

has

characterized as the granting of a "variance.''

been

it was in

was afforded in proceedings before zoning authorities, on a

reality a change of authorized

request to change the authorized use of a particular pared

parcel ofprope1ty. The concept of a variance is narrowly

land use for a particular

of land. Simplot Soilbuilders,

treated by LC.

s

from Bonneville County a variance to construct a fertilizer

67-6516. part of the Local Planning Act of
1975, which had been enacted before Simplot filed its

storage and blending facility in an area zoned A-1

application with the county. The statute defines a variance

agricultural. The owners of adjoining property, John and

as follows:

Inc., sought and obtained

Janice Gay. brought this action to vacare the variance. They
alleged that numerous procedural errors had infected th.e
variance granting process. and that certain findings made by
the zoning authorities were unsupported by a skerchy
record. The district court upheld the variance and dismissed
the Gays' complaint. We reverse.

a

modification

of the

requirements

of the

[zoningj

ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width, depth, front
yard. side yard, rear yard, setbacks, parking space, height of
buildings, or other ordinance provision affecting the size or
shape of a structure or the placement of the strncture upon
lots, or the size of lots.
A variance, as so defined, does not include a change of
authorized land use. Rather, it is limited to adjustment of

The threshold question is whether the district court
applied the correct standard of judicial re\·iew. The district

ce1tain regulations concerning the physical characteristics

court--following what had been a well-established line of

of the subject property,

Idaho decisions--held that all actions of zoning authorities

APPENDIX 2

It is not disputed in this
U()CS

thm

at 951.

fertilizer storage

facility foll outside the scope of permitted land
in an A-I agricultural
Th;;
procured

by Simplot made pcrmissibk a land use prcYiously not
authorized by the zoning ordinance. \Ve cannot
a
rcqu;;st for such a
diffcrcntly
Coup2r. \Ve hold that the Cooper
requirement of procedural Jue process is applicahk to
proceedings on a request to change the land use authorized

Bonne\·ille County and Simplot
In the present
ha\c argued that the failures identified in Cooper mcrdy
illustrate factors rck,,:ant to

due process (k:tcnnin:1tion,

and that none of them r..:pre:--cnts
procc,s per

a deprivation

of due

l !mYcYCL ,pccific findings and notice of

rnccting,--from which

infer the right to

reasonable

opportunity to present and to rebut cvidcncc--have bc:cn
clements of procedural due

for a particular parcel of property. rcgardkss of whether the

recognized as fundamental

suh_j;:ct of such prncccdings carries the label "variance" or

process in a rnricty of contexts. See,
Gms i. Lope::,
419 l:S. 565. 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 LEd.2d 725 ( 1975): Wolf/1.

!!rc1oning, '

1

Ak!Jomwl!, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935
The right to procedural

due process is secured by

(1974). ?vloreo\eL

view a transcribabk

proceedings where the sufficiency of notice. adequacy of
opportunity to present or to rebut e\·idcncc, or the existence
of e\·idence supporting the agency's findings may be put at

process protection has not been cont.::sted

111

this case.

The United States Supreme Court has imparted
elastic quality to the concept of procedural due process.

an

'[Djuc process' .. is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time. place and circumstances ..
[ I ]dentification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:

judicial

as

That adJoining land mrners, who arc ''affected persons"
under LC.~ 67-6521. have prope11y interests entitk,d to due
llcncc, we presume such interests to exist, "and the question
then is what process is due." Van Orden r. S1£1te, I 02 Idaho
663,665.637 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1981).

indispensable to meaningful

record

Article L Section I of the Idaho Constitution and by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

of rezoning

issue. [ l] Under Idaho law, a rezoning decision might be
reviewed on any of thc:se points. LC
67-5215(g).

~~

67-652l(d).

We believe that all the factors mentioned in Cooper,
together with the opportunity to present and to rebut
evidence, meet the standards for due process requirements
under :vlathews \·. Eldridge, infra. First, each requirement is
germane to the property interests of parties seeking. or
ad\usely affected by, a change of zoning. Secondly, the
requirements afford minimum safeguards against erroneous

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official

deprivation of such interests Finally, none of the
requirements appears to be unduly burdensome. Even the

action; second. the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probative

requirement of a transcribable rccord--which has excited
some controversy in this appcal--compcls zoning authorities

rnlue, if any. of additional or sub,titute procedural
safeguards: and finally,

to do no more than conduct the public's business "on the
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(651 P.2d 563J the Government's interest, including the

function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or suhstitutc requirements would entaiL

Mathrns

L

Eldridge, 424 US 3 I 9. 334-35, 96 S.Ct

893. 902-03, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 ( 1976): accord. Van Orden v.
State. supra. The full dimensions of procedural due process,
as contemplated by the Cooper decision, have yet to be

record." preserve document;; received and produced. and
operate a tape recorder during hearings or meetings when
information on a rcqueskd zoning change is received or
official action is taken. Accordingly, we hold that notice,
opportunity to present and to rebut evidence, preparation of
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the
keeping of a transcribable record comprise a common core
of procedural due process requirements, constitutionally
mandated in all cases where zoning authorities arc
requested to change the land use authorized for a particular
parcel of property.

developed. However, on the facts presented in Cooper, our
Supreme Court held that a deprivation of due process
resulted from (a) failure to give notice of a second meeting
of zoning authorities (after a public hearing), when a

II
'vVe tum now to the questions of whether. and how,
these due process requirements should be applied to the

rezoning request was considered and staff views were

instant case. As noted previously. Cooper was decided

expressed; (b) failure to keep a transcribabk verbatim
record of the proceedings before the zoning authorities; and

,vhile this appeal was pending. Bonneville County and
Simplot, in a well-crafted brief and argument, urge that

(c) failure to make specific written findings of fact and
conclusions of law, upon which the decision on the

requirements
11

based

on

Cooper

not

he

applied

rctroactively" here.

rezoning request was based. Cooper. IO l Idaho at 41 L 6 I 4

APPENDIX 2

Thcr\! arc no con:-;titutional limitations upon a court's
chuic~ to gi\'C cith::r rctroai:ti\.-c or prospective effect to a
ckci-;ion altering a prmr mk of la,\·. Unklcrter 1 Wulker.
3~! US 618. 85 S Ct. !73L 14

expel'.! that the decision of th-: county zoning authorities
u!titnarcly \Yould he upheld und-:r the prt:-Coope:r standard
ofjudi1.:iill rc\-i~v-,
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crik'ria tn be considered in choo;;ing among the Yarious
rdroactivity and pro~pcctiYit:,,; alternati\·c~
It 1nu:-;t be
\\:cigh-!d against t\YO orhcr critcria--thc purp1.):-:;,.; of the nc-..v

Reliance upon an existing rule of law is one of the

1651 P.2d 56-lj LEd.2d 601 (1965): Gr<!a! .\'nrrlicm
i ~'->'nnhunt Oil & R<flning Co __ 2X7 llS. 358.
53 S.Ct. 145. 77 LEd. 360 ( I 932) The choice i,

Roilna_r Co.

discretionary. The range of availahlc choices include,

ruk, of law announced. and the effect of rctnnctidty

or

prospcctivity upon the administration ofjusticc. See, e.g.,

applying the ruk only to future ca,c, ("prospectivity");

Jones ,. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (l977J:
Rogers 1·. Ycl!mrsronc Pwk Cu .. 97 Idaho 14, 25, 539 P.2d
566. 577 (1974) (on rehearing): Thompson v. Hagan. supra.

applying the rule to htturc cases and tu the case ckcidcd (a

Ordinarilv. these criteria are considcrd

form of "modified prospcctivity"J: or applying the rule to

announcmg a new rule of law. l lowcvcr, because no such

applying a new rule of la,\ to ali cases ("rctro:icti\ity"J:

in the decision

fi.rture cases. to the case decided, and to similar cases

analysis has yet been aniculakd in connection with Cooper,

pend mg on appeal when the new rule was announced ( a

and h('caus;,; the instant ca;;c is as;s;crted to he dissirnilar.

broader form

will analY7e the criteria here.

of "modified prospccti\'ity").

Sec, e.g ..

lllompson v. /lag,m, 96 Idaho I 9, 523 P.2d 1365 (l 974 J:
Dawson 1. Olson, 94 Idaho 636. 496 P.2d 97 ( 1972). For

\VC

The reliance claimed by Simplot is not upon the

case of rdcrcnce, we will call the broader form of modified

pre-Cooper rule

prospectivity the ''pipeline approach." because it includes

applying the pre-Cooper standard nccc,sarily would han·

itself,

but upon

an expectation that

similar cases in the appellate system "pipeline'' when the
new rule of law was announced.

resulted in upholding the county's zoning decision. We need
not indulge in an "opinion within an opinion,"

actually

applying the pre-Cooper standard. It is sufficient to note

In Cooper our Supreme Court did not explicitly pass on
the rctroactiYity question. llowc\·er. the court applied its

that judicial review in this case ,ms sought to determine

holding on procedural due process to the facts of that case.

county authorities: whether findings of fact. which were

Similarly, in Walker-Schmidt Ranch v. Hlaine County. IOI

entered specifically in response to this litigation and which

whether the proper zoning ordinance had been used by the

Idaho 420. 614 P.2d 960 (1980)--a rezoning case pending

consisted partly of a recitation of language from the zoning

\\'hen Cooper was dccided--tbe Supreme Court reversed a

ordinance, were valid; and whether the findings of fact were

determination by zoning authorities, and remanded the case

adequately suppo1ied by a record

with an instruction

tLl the district court that the zoning

authorities be directed

to comply with Cooper. Thus. it
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plainly appears that the Supreme Court has not explicitly
rejected retroactivity, and has. at least. adopted the

1651 P,2d 565] which consisted partially of disputed

"pipeline approach"--applying Cooper to the case decided

recollections by zuning officials of the proceedings before

and to similar cases pending when the rule of Cooper was

them. \Ve cannot say that the final disposition

announced, as well as to fuhrrc cases. \\'e need not address

issues, on appeal, would have been free from doubt under

of such

the possibility of "rdroactivity" in this case. The "pipeline

the pre-Cooper standard. 0.loreowr. when the district judge

approach" is sufficient to determine the impact of Cooper

was informed that Simplot had started construction while a

upon this appeal.

petition for judicial re\·iew was pending. he pointedly stated
on the record. that "you are building at your peril, as it

Simplot and Bonneville County contend that this case

were." Simplot's counsel acknowledged

that "[tjhere arc

outside the "pipeline" because it is not a ''similar"

cenain risks from this point on, I suppo,c." The weight that

pending case. They point to the fact that Cooper and

might otherwise ha\·c been ascribed to the reliance criterion

Walker-Schmidt were appeals from judgments upholding
denials of rezoning request:;. In contrast. this appeal has

is diminished in this case.

IS

been taken from a judgment upholding the grant of a change
in authorized land use. The significance of this distinction,
we are told, is that during the course of this litigation

Against this diminished

claim of reliance we must

weigh the effect of the "pipeline approach'' upon the

Simplot actually constructed the facility for which the

purpose of the Cooper decision. and upou the
administration of justice. The following language from the

change in authorized land use had been sought. Simplot

Cooper opinion is relevant to both of these criteria:

does not contend that the appeal has been rendered moot.
Hmvever. we arc now asked to exempt this case from due

It is clear that there is a pressing need in Idaho for

process scrutiny on the ground that Simplot had a right to

established

standards

and

procedures

by

which

APPENDIX 2

paniculctri?cd land 11,e regulation is to be administered. To
allow the dbcrctiun of local ?oning: bodies to remain
, irtual!Y unhmikd

1n

the dctcrn1i1ution of indi\·idual right,

is to condon;; government by men rath(:r than go\"CTnn1cnt

conducted proceedings in confon11ity \Yith th:: r:.:quircn1ents
\\'l' ha\\: dra,rn from Cooper. ·1 hcrd'orc. rhc judgment of
the di,trict coun i, rc\·erscd. and the c:rn,c b remanded \,;ith
direction that the district court rt:":quirc

by hw. [101 Idaho at 41 L 61-l P.2d at95!.]
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\Ve hdic\\: thi;:, clear cxp1\;:;:iion of purpose \VOutJ t-v
thwarted if we refused to apply the requirement:-;
of
procedural due prncc" to this case. It appears that the
county zoning authorities

1651 P.2d 566] B,mne,·ille County to rccon,ider Si,11plnt's
rcquc,t in conformity with this opinion.

mack no specific findings to

support their decision until faced with a lawsuit testing: the

WALTERS. C Land SWANSTRO:\L J., concur.

rnlidity of the decision. !t further appear, that the findings
were based largdy upon one zoning board member's
farni liarity with the property in question. The county kept
no transcribabk record from which a reviewing court could
dcrerminc the extent to which the infonnation known to this
boanl member was presented at a public meeting of\\·hich
notice had been given. or the extent to which the interested
parties were afforded an opponunity to rebut such evidence.

Notes:

11] Since the filing: of this appeal, the Idaho Legislature has
imposed a statutory requirement of a transcribablc record
upon all land tl:ic proceedings where judicial re\icw is
anilablc. Sec LC.§ 67-6536 (added in l982J

We also bclicw that the proper administration of
justice \\ill best be served by applying due process
requirements here. Due to the lack of an adequate record of
\\·hat had transpired at the county level, the district judge
was forced to take conflicting evidence. and to make
findings, on how the zoning proceedings were conducted
and on what basis the county reached its decision. The court
then was required to review the propriety of the county's
decision upon a record which the coun itself had
participated rn creating. Developing the record of
proceedings

before

an

administrative

agency,

from

conflicting evidence, falls outside the purposes for which a
re\·iewing court should take C\idencc under applicable
portions of !.C. ~ 67-5215. Cl ffill 1·. Board o(County
Comm 'rs, 10 I Idaho 850, 623 P.2d 462 ( I 981) (holding trial
de novo inappropriate upon petition for judicial review of
denial of a rezoning application). :Vlorc fundamentally, we
view this process as a dist011ion of the judicial review
function.
\Neighing all of the criteria--reliance on the prior rnle
of law, the purpose of the new rnle. and the effect upon the
administration ofjusticc--we conclude that the "pipeline
approach" to Cooper is appropriate and that it embraces this
case. \Ve hold that the procedural due process requirements
we have drawn from Cooper govern disposition of this
appeal. Because no transcribable record was kept and
because, without such a record. a reviewing court in this
case could not determine that the interested parties recci\·ed
notice of all meetings at which information concerning th;c
zoning request was received. or that an opportunity to rebut
such information was affiirded, we conclude that the
county's decision must be set aside.
The other issues raised by the petition for judicial
re\·iew likely would be mooted. or resolved, if the county
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BACKGROUND
The State and Nauort stipulated to a brief statement of facts: Nauer(.
consented to an evidentiary breath teat for the presence of alcohol in hii;; body after
being provided with an administrative license suspension (ALS) warning. Nnucrt
challenged the constitutional validity <if .his consent via n Motion to Suppress. He
also filed a Motion in Limine challenging the validity of the standard opentting
procedures (SOPs) and manuals created by the Idaho State Police (ISP) to govern

evidentiary.testing for alcohol and the foundations for the admist3ihilit.y of those test
tesults.
The ·Magistrate Judge denied Nauert's motions. As a result of his challenges
being rejected, Nauert enl,ered a conditional guilty plea and appealed the
Magistrate .Judge's decisions to this Court.

LAW
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed on a bifurcated
standard. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 238 P.3d 1286 (Ct. App. 2010). FindingH
of fact supported by substantial evidence are accepted, but the reviewing court
considers (;he application of constitutional principles de novo. Id., 149 Idaho Ht 870~
233 P.3d at 1292.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that citizens shall
be secuT.e from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that no warrants shall be
issued except upon a showing of probable cause. U.S. CONST. iU1F.ND. IV. Article I,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plamtiff/Respondent,
vs.
MARTIN EUGENE NAUERT,

Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Caso No. CV-2018-1017()
MEMORANDUM OPINION

)
)
)

------

______)

In this case, the defendant, ifortin Eugene Nauert, entered a conditional
guilty plea to Driving Under the Influence of AL<1ohol, a misdemeanor, in violation of
LC.§ 18-8001. Nauort now HJ)peals to this Coutt, challenging the Magistrate

,Judge's denials of his Motion to Suppress and his Motion in Limine. The case wus

submitteti on the brief of Nauert without oral argument as authorized by LA..R.
37(e). For reasons that have never been explained, tho State did not respond t,o
N au£3rt' s brief.
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§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides similar, alt.hough some would argue greater,

'protection agHinat unreasonable searchas.
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment
requirement for a search warrant. Wheelei', 149 Idaho at 370, 233 P.8d at 1292.
Under Idaho Code § 18-8002(1), every oporator of a motor vehicle in the Btate of
Idaho is deemed to have given consent to evidentiary testing for alcohol
concentration. 1 This iB commonly 1·eforrcd.to as implied consent. Among other
provisions, the implied consent statute authorizes the imposition of a $250 penalty
and (,he susi}om,ion of one's driving privilegei, for one year for refusal to submit to
· testing. LC.§ 18-8002. Both the financial penalty and the loss of driving privileges
are characterized as civil penalUcs. A driver may also be shown to freely and
voluntarily consent t.o an ov:icl.entiary test, such as a breath test, in light of all the
cfrcumstances. State 1J. Varie, 135 Idaho 818; 852, .26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001).

1

J.C. § 18-8002(1) stateC'!:
Any person who drives or is in physical control of a motor vehicle in this etaoo shall
be doomed lo have given his consent to evidontiary teetlng for concentration of
alcohol as defined in section 18·8004, Idaho Code, and to have given his consent tu
ovidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 1:1ubstancea,
provided that such testing is administered a~ the rcquctiit uf a peace officer having
roasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving or in ai,.-tual physical
control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provision" of sectionJ6-&0.Q4, T!,'.1.aho
Code, or l:lection 18-8006, Idaho Code.
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ANALYSIS
The Magistrate Judge Did Not Err in Denying Nnuert's Motion to
Suppress, Because Nauert's Consent to Breath Testing Was Not Coerced
Nauert argues that his consent was unconstitutional because he wafi coercod
into agreeing to have his breath tested for alcohol. He eonte11ds he was forced to
agree to the testing because of the onerous penalties he faced if he we1·e to refuse
testing. The ALS advisory informs the driver, among other things: ''You arc
required by law to take one or more evidentiai·y test{s) to determine the

concentration of alcohol 01· p1·esenco of drugs or other intoxicating substances in
your body." Following this admonition ii, a list of civil penalties that may be
imposed against a drivel' for his refusal to undergo testing. (As noted, these include
a fine of up to $250 and lose of one's driving.privileges fo1· one year. The ALS
advhmry does not advise the driver that the test resulti;, if (;hey show an alcohol
concentration of .08

01'

above, may be inti'Oduce,d in a criminal tdal and that such a

showing would result in the driver being found to have been operating the vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol. LC. § 18-8004(1)(a).)
Nauert argues that Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) requires a
different analysis of what warning is required regarding hifi criminal case. Nt-tuerL

seems to argue that because the implied consent advisory does not advise the dtiver
of the cri,ninal implications of taking the test and failin·g it, that it cannot ho
considered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver for criminal purposes.

In McNeely 1 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that:
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States have a bmad range of legal t.ools to enforce theii: qrunk-driving
laws and to secure BAO evidence ,n:ithout undertaking warrantless
nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States have adopted
implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating
a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are
arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.

Id. at 1566.
The /1,,fcNee(y Cuu1't also cited South Dat-wta v. Neville, 459 l].R 553 (1983).
In Nev£lle; the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed _certain aspects of South Dakota's
intpliod consent law. Id. Tho Supreme Court found that the law allowed a one-year
civil revocation of a driver'i:: license for :refusal t,o allow testing after the driver was

given an opportunity for a hearing. Id., 459 U.S. at fi60. The Supreme Court then
stated succinctly: "Such penalty for refusing to take blood-alcohol test is
'

<

t~

unquestionably legitimate, assuming appropriate procedural protections." Jd.
However, the U.S. Sup1·eme Court further stated in a footnote:
Even though the officers did not specifically advise respondent that the
test resultF. could be used against him in court, no one would seriously
contend that hii; fnilure to warn would make tho test results
inadmissible, had respondent chosen to submit to the test ....
While the State did not actually warn respondent that the test results
could be used against him [in a criminal trial], wo holcl that 8uch a
failure to warn was not the sort of implicit promise to forego tisc of
evidence t,hat would unfairly "t1·ick" respondent; if the evidence were
l~ter offered against him at trial. ...

Icl., 459 U.S. at 565 n. 16, 566.
Given tlia.t McNeely specifically references Neville, it does not l'cqui:re, the
invalidation of the consent to bmnth tcstin a ctiminal case. This Court is troubled
by the advisory .warning'~ :(~ih,1re t_o m.entio~ th~t the breath test administered may
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be used in a criminal prosecution. Were it not for the controlling precedent of South

Dakota v. Neville, ~nd the U.S. Supreme Court's tacit recognition of tho continuing
viability of Neville, this Court would find that Nauert's consent was invalidated by a
fai)ure to warn him of the criminal consequences of taking and failing the breath
tost.J:! It is not: possible to qonclude that Nauert's consent was knowing, intelligent,

or voluntary absent t;he footnote in Neville. Howeve1·, this Court is constrained by
the decifiion of the United States SuJ}reme Court in Neville, where the justices
deter.mined that officers need not specifically warn a driver thnt, olcohol test results
·may he used against him in a criminal trial. Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 n. Hi. As a
result, this Court must conclude that Nauert's consent was valid for the purposes of

criminal prosecution, and the Magistrate Judge did not err in denying the motion to
·,

suppress.

In

The Magistrate Judge Erred
Denying Na.ucrt's Motion in Limine,
Because the State Did Not Offer the Breath Testing Evidence Through a
Valid Alternative to Expert Testimony Under the Rules of Evidence
The gravamen of Nauert's molion in liminc is that the SO Pe and manuals,
formulated by the ISP to implement the statutes authorizing breath-testing and its
admissibility in court, have never been adopted as rules. Becaui,e of the ISP's
failure to promulgate rules, the procedures required to establii,h the reliability of

the ·breath testing were not fulfilled and. the magistrate judge should have rejected
2 It should be pointed out that a driver in Nauert's situation is not entitled to the advice of coun~<.11 under
the drcun:t.!ltanccs. Matter of McNeely, 119 Idaho 182,189,804 P.2d 9TI, 9·18 (Ct. App. 1990); J.C.§ ·188002(2). 1).s a result, Naµert was never informed of the legal consequences he faced in a crimmal
prosecution and he was deprived of the ability to be apprised of the c:unsequE!nces by ftis lawyer.
Consequently, it it; htlld. to understand how Nauert's conscmt was knowing, ilttdligcnt, or volwttary.
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the result13 of Nnuert's breath testing whori challenged through the motion in

lintine. This Court agrees that whatever else can be said of the SOPs and manuals
they.are not Hrules" and therefore do not have the effect of rules. Consequently, the
magistrate judge erred when he denied Naue·rt's motion _in limine.
Idaho Code§§ 18~8002A(3) and 18-8004(4) purpm·tcdly exercise thA state
legi8lature's power to regulate the admission of alcohol testing evidence in DUI

cases.a These statutes confer upon tho ISP, an executive branch agency, the
"1·asponsibility for authorizing alcohol content testing proceclures ..." State v.

:l LC§ 18-8002A(3) staks:

Rulemakjng authority of the Idaho stau~ police. Tbe Idaho state police may, pursuant lo
chapter 52, title 67, Idaho C9dc, pr~.-.cribe by rule:
(a) What testing ls required to complete evidentiary testing under this section; and
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to comply with
the department's requirements. Any rules of the Idaho state police shall be ht accordance
with the following: a test for ak<Jhol concentration in breath a/i defined .in section 18~8004,
. Idaho Code, and subsection (l)(e) of this section will be valid for the purposes of this
section if the bre.ath alcohol testing instrument wa.4 approved for testing by the Idaho
state police in accordance with section 18~8004, Idaho Code, at any time within ninety
(90) days before the evident!ary iesth1g. A test for alcohol concentration in blood o~ urh1e
as defined in section 18-8004, Id.a.ho Codc, that is reported by the Idaho state police or by
any laboratory approved by the Idaho srete police to perfonn this tC'st will be valid for
lhe pmposes of this section.

I.C. § 18-8004(4) states:
l:lor purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol conccntrntion shall be based
upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hUt\dred. (100) cubk centimeters of blood, per
two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-seven (67} milliliters of urine. Analy~i:. of
blood, udm~ or breath for the purpose of deter.mining thl~ alcohol concentration shall be
performed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory
approved by the Idaho slate police under the provisions uf approval aud certification
standards to be set by that deparl:ntent, or by any other .tnethod approved by the Idaho
state police. Notwithstanding ttny other provision of law or :rule of court, the resulls of
any h:!st for alcohol com;:entra.tion and records relat1ng to calibration, approval,
ccrtificatlo11 or quality control performed by a Iaboralory operated or approved by the
Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police shall be
admissible h1 any proceeding in this state without the n~ce11sity of producin3 a witness to

c.\11tablish the reliabHity of the testing procedure f9r cxam_inatio.n.
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Besaw, 155 Idaho 184, _ - - , 306 P.3d 219, 227-29 {Ct. App. 2013) (discussing
State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988)).

statutory duty

authority, the ISP

generated
The ISP has

administrative rules, the SOPs,
1>romulgatcd IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03, which reads as follows:

Breath tost.s shall be administered in conformity with standards
established by the department. Standards shall he developed for each
type of breath testing instrument u1.,ed in Idaho, and such standards
shall be issued in the form of analytical methods and Stl-mdard
ope.rating procedures. [Effective] (4-7-11)
The SOPs and manuals are not contained in JDAPA 11.03.01. Neithe1• are
they formally incorporated by reference in that chapter.-1 No court has ever
detormined that the SOPs and manuals constitute "rules'> for purposes of the APA.

Besaw, 155 Idaho at_, _

n. 2, 306 P.3d at 225, .225 n. 2 ("[T]he Idaho State

Police agency is cha1·ged with prescribing ~y rule approved equipment for testing
breath alcohol content and standards for administration of such tests. We have
treated [the SOPs and manuals] as 'rules' for the purpose of judicial review because
the parties have done so and because they constitute t.he oniy materiah; by which
the ISP has purported to authorize testing instruments and methods ..... We have
not, however, held that these SOPs and manuals actually constitute 'rules' or that

()n the other hand, under IDAPA 11.03.o-l,004 the lSP has formally incorporated a list of conforming
breath testing devices which have been approved by the ISP. This action superseded the dC'cii,ion of the
Court of Appeals inAJfard, which said that approval of breaU1 testing devices was not an ag<,~ncy action
subjecL to the requirements of the APA. State v. Alford, 1:;J9 Idaho 595, 597~98, 83 P.3d 139, 141-42
(Ct. App. 2004).
·1
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the ISP hus 'prescribed by rule' testing instruments and methods as con(.emplatod
by [statute]; thatissuo has never been presented to this Court.").
In Besaw, the Court of Appeals recognized that there was ''troubling
information about the manner in which the SOPs for breath testing have been
developed or amended ..." Besaw, 306 P .3d at 229. The Court of Appeals found

that certain "cmaih; a.11d memos to and frorrrISP [were] disturbing [because they]

lacked any apparent regar<i for the way proposed changes couJd affect the validity of
the tests." Id. The BeBaW court disapproved of tho apparent objective of certain ISP
personnel to "thwart all possible defense challenges to the admission of breath tests
rather than to adopt standards that will maximize the accuracy of tests upon which
individuals may be convicted of serious crimes and deprived of their liberty.'' Id.
The court alRo noted that there seemed to be "a conscious avoidance of any
opportunity for suggestions or critiques from persons outside the law enforcement
community." Id.· In a footnote, the Court of Appeals explained that avoidance of
scrutiny for the SOPs would be impossible if they had been pl'Omulgated according
to the APA. Id. at 229 n. 5.
Under the APA, an administrative rule implementing a statute mufil, undergo
a specific process to become final, and given the force and effect oflaw. The SOPs
and :mnnuals have not been promulgated to comport with APA rulemnking
requirements. The ISP provides no notice in the administrative bulletin before the
SOPs and :manuals are adopted (as required by LC.§§ 67-5220 and 67-5221); t,he

ISP accepts no public comments and holds no public hearing on tho SOPs (a8
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required by I.C. § 67~5222); the ISP does not submit the SOPs to any legislative
review (aB required by LC. §§ 67-5223 and 67-5291). Certainly, ·from a procedural
and legal standpoint, the SOPs and manuals are not administrative ruleB.
- Given that the SOPf:l and manuals have never been estnblishcd as ''rules," the
question facing this Court is a matter of first impression: Are the SOPs and

manm1ls valid authority which enable the admission of Nauert's breath testing
without expert t.estimony? To answer that; inquiry, this Court must. ask the

unavoidable question of wha(; the SOPs and mam.1als a1·e: Since they are not rules,
what Jegal effect do they have?
Because the SOPs and manuals are not rules, they cannot be given tho force
and effect of law generally ascribed to administrative rules. Mead, 117 Idaho at
664, 791 P.2d at 414. The SOPs are, at most, internal guidelines or.standards. See

Service Employeea Irit'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare,_ lOt>
Idaho 75H, 759,683 P.2d 404, 407 (1984) (reaffirmed jn Nation v. State, Dept. of

Correctiori, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007)). As internal guidelines, the SOPs
and manuals may be changed with impunity by the agency head whenever he
choosea, and are not vetted by anyone other than the ISP. Internal guidelines <lo
not have the force and effect oflaw. Id. They can only govern the internal
management of an agent~y and c:annot affect ptivate rights or procedures available
to the J)tthlic. Id. As a ·result, internal guidelines arc also incapable of affecting the
Rules of Evidence.
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The APA provides no saving support for the authority of the SOPs and
manuals. As defined by I.C, § 67~5201(21), a "standatd" is:
(A] manual, guideline, criterion, specification, requirement
measurement ot other authoritative principle pmviding a model 01·
pattern in comparison with which the correctness or appropriateness of
l:lpecified actions, practices or procedures may be determined.
Without incorporation by reference and in compliance with the APA, the SOPs and

manualR have no legal effect beyond the management, of the ISP. At moi:,t, the
SOPs tmd manuals arc unincoryJotat,ed st..-mdarcls, manuals, and internal.

guidelineR, nothing more. As a result they have no power to give effect to LC. §§ 18. 8002A(3) and 18-8004(4). It is inexplicable that such an insubstantial basis could
divert the course of the judiciai·y in the manner it has. Nevertheless, that is where
we now ai·e.

What the ISP has done is, in effect, const1·uct an end nm around the APA and
ultimately the Rules of Evidence. If the ISP were required to follow rule making .
procedures, the SOPs and :manuals would at least be subject to outside scrutiny, To

the extent they are arbitrary or capricious, they could.be struck down. I.C. § 675270, v\'hile the state legislature is not required to presc1·ibe standards to control
an agency's rulemaking discretion, the legislation itRclf or the agency's iutci·nal
guidelines should provide "meaningful safeguards against arbitnlry decision
making" such as a 11.ght to a hearing or judicial review. Sun Valley Co. u. City of

Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 428, 708 P.2d 147, 151 (1985) (abrogate(l on other
gi·ounds). As noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, in .Besaw, there is "troubling

information about the mnnner in which the SOPs for breath testing have been
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developed or umended ..." Besaw, 155 Idaho at_, 306 P.3d at 229. This
conclusion is especially disconcerting when it is remembered that t,he results of the

breath test effectively create stl'ict liability for a drivet· whose breath test shows an
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. The result of where we are today is that thorc
is no Rcientific support fo1· t:he processes to be employed in administering a test t.hnt
holds a driver strictly liable for driving under the i11flucnco. Not only i1;, this reault
peohibitcd by our Rules of Evidence, it also faj]a to meet the requirement of
fundamental fairness.
As the process currently stands, thete a1·e no "meaning:fol safeguards" to
ensure that the SOPs ate neither orhitrary nor capricious. (In fact, the Court of
Appeals has cast serious doubt on the SOPs and mariunls because they seem to be ·
promulgated in a way to avoid scrutiny.· Besaw, 155 Idaho at_, 30(1 P.3cl at 229.)
'I'hel'e is no indication whatsoever that the legislature itself exercises any oversight

of the development of the SOPs and manuals. Without oversight, there i.s no
assurance that the SOPs and manuals ate anything other than s(;llf-serving.
Given that the SOPA and manuals are not rules, they cannot aupplant the
Rules of Evidence. (They also cannot abrogate the separation of powers doctrine or

the requirement of due process, hut those are ot,her issues.) I.RE. 1102 makes it
· clear that statutes and rules cannot 1:iffect the Rules of Evidence: "Statutory
provisions and rules governing the admissihHity of evidence, to the extent they are

evidentinry and to the extent that they are in conflict with applicable rules of Idaho
Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect." With that as a t:itart;ing point, it is a
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fortiori that tho SOPs and manuals, which are neither statutes nor rules, could
somehow effec_t

fl

change of the rule1;1 of evidence in the way sought, If Rtatutcs and

rules cannot alter the Rule8 of Evidence, something that has never been
promulgated as a rule 1,-urely Cllnnot affect the Rules of Evidence.
The f1dmissibility of evidence is a matter within the inherent judicial power of
the Idaho Supl'eme Court to establish rules and procetlures. Idaho Const., Art. V,

§§ 2, 13;_ LC.§ 1-212 (recognizing the judiciary'13 inherent powers); and LR.R l 102
(which tellects the judiciary's primacy when it comes to ma(;ters of evidence:

"Statutory provisions and rulel:l governing the admissibi]ity of evidence, to the
extent they are evidentiary and to the extent that they are in conflict with

applicable rules of Idaho Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect."). The

legiidature has no power to deprive the judiciary of its powers, but may regulate by
law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the cxorcjse of those powers of
aH the com'ts inferior to the Supreme Court, so long as ii, cloes not conflict witl1 the
state constitution. Idaho Const., Ai·t. V, § 13. The Rules of Evidence may only be
amended by the Supreme Court;. Art. V, § 13 does not, ~rive the legislature the
ability to modify those Rules of Evidence. Indeed, "to the extent, t;hnt the rule [of

evidence] places greater strictures upon the use of such evidence than does the
statute 1 the 1·ulc must gove1·n." State v. Rick8, 122 Idaho 856, 860, 840 P.2d 400,
404 (Ct. App. 1992).

The Court of Appeals has, somewhat inexplicably, concluded that I.e. § J 88002A(3) simply provides an alternative method to satisfy the foundational
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requirements for s~icntific testimony in the Rules of Evidence. State v. Nickerson,
132 Idaho 406, 410-11, 973 P.2d 758, 762-63 (Ct,. App. 1999). However, the cw;e
law upon which Nickerson relies makes it clear that the statutes have not done

away with foundational requirement.s. See State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 39, 764 P.2d
113, 117 (Ct. App. 1988):

The aCt!eptance by the Legislature of test procedm-es as designated by
the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare docs not wholly eliminote
the need of m,tahfo;hing foundational requirements for a test result.
This is required even in light of the legislative directive to uGlize an
expedient means to admit such evidence. The ndoption of the
particular test procedure merely recognizes the validity and relinhility
of that particular accepted teAt. It must still be established at trial
that those procedures which ensure the reliability and in turn the
accuracy of the tef.t have been met.
What has boon happening with the SOPs and manuals as of late is more than just a
legislative substitute for scientific reliability. The fact of the matter is that the ISP
is now ve1:1ted with the unilateral power to prescribe the admission of breath testing
evidence in Idahds courts. As a rermlt, this statute violates the Repamtions of
powers doctrine. State v. J.tioore, 160 Idaho 17, 20,244 P.3d 161, 164 (2010) "The
separatiou of powers docti·ine embodies the concept that the three branche1; of
government, legisfotivo, executive and judicial, should remain separate and distinct
so that each ii, able t,0 operate independently." (quoting Sweeney v. Otter, llH Idaho
135,139,804 P.2d 308, 312 (1990)); Estep v. Comm'rs of Boundary County, 122
Idaho 345, 347, 834 P.2d 862, 864 (1992) "The only exception to the separatlon of
powers doctrine occurs where the exercise of another branch's powor is expreBsly

directed or permitted by. the constitution."
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It is unsettling to think that the ISP is allowed to draft SOPs and manuals
given tho force and effect of law without any oversight. This is tantamount t:o a
wholesale assignment of power to an executive branch agency, when the Supreme
Court has said this is an area solely governed by the Court. It is axiomatic thflt the

legislature is vested with the nuthority to make laws, not the executive. Idaho
Const., Art. III, § 1, Art, II, § 1. It is even more unsettling to think that the ISP
woidd be granted the power to dictate the procedural operationf; of the judicial
branch. This is a p1·erogativc the judiciary, at least in the past, has been unwilling
to relinquish. R.E. W Const. Co. v. Dist. Ct. of the Third Judicial Dist., 88 ldaho
.426, 437-38, 400 P.2d 390, 397 (1965); t;ee also, In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128
Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (19BG).
This Court is unwilling to endorse the ISP'.s unchecked exercise of power over
(.he judicial process. The judiciary of this state ''has consistently acted to protect
against encroachment of one department of government on another."Mead, l 17
Idaho fit 669, 791 P.2d at 419. In deciding cases and co11troversics the jud~ciary
must he mindful of the "enduring consequences upon the balanced power structure"
of om· democratic system. Id. (quoting the U.S. Stlpreme Court's opinion in

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Smvyer, :343 U.S. 579 (1952)). The ISP cannot
unilaterally direct what foundation, if any, is required for the admission of b1'eath
test evidence in Idaho's courts. Yet the current system amounts to tho functional
· equivalent of a transfer of that authority.
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CONCLUSION
For the reason~ stated above, this Court concludes that the Magjst,t·ate Judgo
erred in overruling Nauert'~ challenge to the adm1esibilit;y of Naucrt's breath tM,L
results without an adoquate foundation being laid. Accordingly, the Order Denying
the Motion Limine is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Dated this

3

rFi..

day of July 2014.

~·(2~
J~Stegner
District J udgc
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Post Falla P1·nfiecuting Attorney
208•773-0214

[

] Overnight Mail

f ] Fax
[
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On this_ day of July 2014.

Deputy Clerk
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11 l.
Ha,·nes Has Faiied To Show Error in The Distric" Court's Determination That The
Ma istrate Correct! Aooiied The Law To The Facts In Oen in Ha nes' Motion
In Umine To Exclude The Breath Test Results

Haynes challenges the denial of tier motion in /!mine to exciude the results
of her breath test arguing as she did to the magistrate and district courts below
that the accuracy of those results is inherently unreliable for

tv10

reasons.

First, she argues that the breath test resuits were inadmissible because
ISP has failed to comply with its statutory duty to establish methods to ensure
the reliability of breath test results in general. (Appellant's biief, pp.18-24.) The
Idaho Court of Appeals recently considered and rejected this precise argument in
State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied.
Haynes has presented no cogent reason why Besaw should be overruled, nor
has she demonstrated from the record that the testing procedures utilized in her
case actually produced an unreliable resuit. Having failed to do so, Haynes has
failed to show error in the denial of her motion to exclude the test results on this
basis.
Second, Haynes argues that the failure of ISP to comply with the
rulemaking requirements of the !APA in creating SOPs and manuals for breath
alcohol testing renders those SOPs and manuals void and all BAC testing based
on those standards too unreliable for use at a criminal trial. (Appellant's brief,
pp.24-31.) This argument fails for several alternative reasons. First, nothing in
I.C. § 18-8004(4) requires formal rulernaking as a prerequisite to the admissibility
of results of breath tests performed pursuant to methods approved by ISP.
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Second, if ISP's creation of the SOPs is agency action governed by the
requirements of the !APA, Haynes' exclusive means foi challenging such action
was through the judicial review provisions of the 1/·.PA; she has no standing to

raise, and neither the iower courts nor this Court have jurisdiction to considei, a
chailenge to the validity of the SOPs as a basis for excluding breath test results
in a cri:11inal case.

Finaiiy, even if this Court reaches the merits of Haynes'

argument, coriect application of the law shows the SOPs are not rules and, as
such, no compliance with the formal rulemaking requirements of the iAPA was
required.

B.

Standard Of Review

The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district
court in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section 1.8., supra, and
is incorporated herein by reference.
"When a decision on a motion addressing the admissibility of evidence is
challenged, {the appellate court] defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact
supported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho

134, 306 P.3d 219 {Ct. App. 2013), review denied. Questions of law, including
whether the state has satisfied the foundational requirements for the admission
of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, are subject to free review. State v.

Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 452, 988 P.2d 225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v.
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 339, 882 P.2d 993, 994 (Ct App. 1994).
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("
\.J.

Havnes Has Failed To Show An Basis For Reversal Based On Her
Claim, Already Rejected In State v. Besaw, That ISP Has Failed To
Establish Methods To Ensure The Reliability Of BAC T st Results
in order to have the results of a breath test admitted as evidence at trial,

the state must make a foundational showing tha~ the a::lministrative procedures
which ensure the reliabiiity of the test have been met. State v. Healy, 151 Idaho
734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868,
979 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999) (clting State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127, 129, 867 P.2d
1001, 1003 (Ct. App. 1993)). To satisfy this foundational requirement, "the state
may rely on I.C. § 18-8004(4), which provides an expedient method for admitting
BAG test results into evidence when the analysis is conducted pursuant to [Idaho
State Police ("ISP")) standards." State v. Uhlry, 121 Idaho 1020, 1022, 829 P.2d
1369, 1371 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted); accord Healy, 151 Idaho at 737,
264 P.3d at 78; State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406,411, 973 P.2d 758, 763 (Ct.
App. 1999). Specifically, that statute provides:
Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining
the alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory
operated by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by
the Idaho state police under the provisions of approval and
certification standards to be set by that department, or by any other
method approved by the Idaho state police. Notwithstanding any
other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test for
alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method
approved by the Idaho state police st'!all be admissible in a
proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a
witness to establish the reliabiiity of the testing procedure for
examination.
1.C. § 18-8004(4). "If the State elects to proceed under§ 18-8004(4), it must not
only show that the test equipment was approved by [ISP] but also that the
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equipment was operated and the test administered in conformity with [!SPJ
standards." Nickerson. 132 Idaho at 411, 973 P.2d at 763 (citing State v. Bell,
115 !daho 36, 39-40, 764 P.2d 113, i16-17 (Ct. App. 1988)).
Haynes acknowledges that pursuant to !.C. § 18-8004(4), breath test
resuits are admissible if they were obtained in conformity with ISP methods
meant to ensure the reliability of the results. She argues, however, that no such
methods actually exists because ISP has, in seve;al instances, modified its
SOPs for breath alcohol testing by replacing what were once mandatory testing
procedures with testing recommendations that need not be uniformly complied
with, thereby "render[ing] the SOPs incapable of ensuring accuracy" of breath
test results', generally.

(Appellant's brief, pp.18-24.)

Haynes' argument fails

because it is merely a rehashing of the argument already considered and
rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 14244, 306 P.3d 219, 227-29 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied.

Like Haynes, Besaw argued "that although ISP is charged by statute with
adopting alcohol concentration standards meant to ensure the reliability of test
results, the agency has abdicated this responsibility by replacing standards with
testing recommendations that are not meant to ensure the accuracy of test
results but, rather, to facilitate the admissibility of test results." Besaw, 155 Idaho
at 143, 306 P.3d at 228 (emphases original).

Specifical!y, he argued that

because ISP had "changed a number of former 'must' testing requirements to
'shouid' recommendations within the SOPs," the SOPs effectively fail to set forth

any standards for breath testing. 1£.,_ at 143-44, 306 P.3d at 228-29.
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The Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed and, in so doing, rnjected Besaw's
argument, which was based on the dissenting opinion in Wheeler v. Idaho
Transp. De t., 148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d 761 (Ct. App. 2010), review denied, that
'·nonmandatory standards [are] tantamount to no standards at all." Besaw, 155
Idaho at 144, 306 P.3d at 229. A!ihough the Court

\.Vas

troubled by some of the

information Besaw presented "about the manner in which the SOPs for breath
testing have been developed or amended,n the Court was not persuaded by any
evidence before it "that the SOP procedures are incapable of yielding accuiate
tests.''

kl

Because Besaw failed to present any evidence "estabiish[ing] that the

test procedures actuaily authorized by the SOPs and applied in Besaw's case
[were] incapable of producing reliable tests," the Court found "no error in the
magistrate court's denial of Besaw's motion to exclude the test results from
evidence.~ Id.
The reasoning and result of Besaw are controlling in this case.

Like

Besaw, Haynes argues that ISP has replaced the word "must" with the word
"should" in several pi0visions of the SOPs. 5 (Appellant's biief, p.23.) And, like
Besaw, Haynes contends that the replacement of what were once mandatory
breath testing methods with nonmandatory methods has resulted in there being
no "method" at all to ensure the accuracy of breath test results.
brief, pp.20-24.)

(Appellant's

Like Besaw, however, Haynes has failed to present any

5

Although failure to follow a procedure that "should" have been followed would
not have prevented the admission of the test result, Haynes would have been
free to argue that any such failure affected the weight the jury should give the
evidence.
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evidence to demonstrate the SOPs, as amended, are incapable of yielding
accurate results.

Nor has she even argued, much less demonstrated, that

Trooper Keys failed to comply with any of the "recommended" procedures in

administering the breath test in this case or that any such failure aciually affected
the accuracy of her test results.

6

Because she has failed to do so, Haynes, like

Besaw, has fai!ed to show any basis for exclusion of the breath test results in her
case.
Haynes acknowledges the holding of Besaw but asks this Court to
oveiiule it.

(Appellant's brief, pp.22-24.) As support for her request, Haynes

merely repeats the arguments that were presented to and rejected by the Court
in Besaw. (Compare Appellant's brief, pp.20-24 with Besaw, 155 idaho at 14244, 306 P.3d at 227-29.)
does make it so.

That Haynes believes Besaw was wrongly decided

Haynes has not presented any new argument and has not

otherwise pointed to anything in the record to demonstrate that Besaw has
proven over time to be unjust or unwise. Having failed to do so, Haynes has

6

Haynes identifies only two "instances" in which "the SOPs have been modified
so that the word 'must' has been replaced by the word 'should'": «1. The
necessity to have the correct acceptable range limits and performance
verification standard lot numbei set in the instrument prior to evidentiary testing";
and "2. The need to monitor the subject for fifteen minutes prior to the test to
ensure there is no alcohol being regurgitated or in the mouth." (Appellant's brief,
p.23 (citations omitted).) Haynes does not contend Trooper Keys failed to
perform either of these procedures, nor could she based on the record in this
case. Haynes presented no evidence below that Trooper Keys failed to properly
calibrate the breath testing instrument, and the video of the traffic stop,
introduced below as Defendant's Exhibit B, affirmatively shows that Trooper
Keys monitored Haynes for two consecutive 15-minute periods (the officer was
unaware Haynes had gum in her mouth during the first 15-minute observation
period and, so, conducted a second 15-minute observation period after ensuring
Haynes no longer had anything in her mouth) before administering the test.
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failed to demonstrate any basis why Besaw should be overruied. See State v.
Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483,490 (2012) (controlling precedent will
not be overruled "un!ess it is shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the

holding in the case has proven over time to be unwise or unjust" (citations
omitted)).

The district court's decision affirming the magistrate's denial of

Haynes' motion to exclude the breath test results (on the ciaimed basis that there
exist no methods to ensure the reliability of the results) must therefore be
affirmed.

D.

1.

Nothing In LC. & 18-8004(4) Requires Compliance With The
Rulemaking Requirements Of The !APA As A Prerequisite To The
Admfssibility Of Results Of BAC Testing Performed Pursuant To
Methods Approved By ISP

Idaho's DUI statute states it is un!awfu! for a person with "an alcohol
concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as
shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle" on a road or place open to the public.

I.C. § 18-

8004(1){a). Subsection (4), in turn, sets forth a formula of grams of alcohol per

210 liters of breath upon which upon which Man evidentiary test for alcohol
concentration shall be based" and states that such breath tests shall be
performed by an approved laboratory or "by any other method approved by the
Idaho state police." I.C. § 18-8004(4). That subsection continues:
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Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, tha
results of any test for alcohol concentration and records reiating to
calibration, approval, certification or quatity control performed by a
laboratory operated or approved by the Idaho state police or by any
other method approved by the Idaho state police shall be
admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing
procedure for examination.

!.C. § 18-8004(4).
As contemplated by !.C. § 18-8004{4}, !SP has approved certain methods

for breath alcohol testing and standards for the administration of such tests, and
those approved methods have been set out by ISP in the form of "Standard
Operating Procedures" and training manuals (hereinafter collectively "SOPs·).

(See R., pp.34-123, 138-236); State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 140, 306 P.3d
219, 225 (Ct. App. 2013), raview denied.

Haynes does not contend that, in

administering her breath test, Trooper Keys failed to comply with any of the
methods or procedures set forth in the SOPs. Rather, she aigues the methods
themselves are invalid because there is nothing in the record indicating that ISP
complied with the rulemaking procedures of the IAPA, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq., in

adopting the SOPs.

manner in

(Appellant's brief, pp.24-31.)

Haynes' challenge to the

which ISP approved the methods for breath alcohol testing does not

show any basis for exclusion of her breath test results because nothing in the
governing law requires compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA
as a prerequisite to the admissibility of results of SAC testing performed pursuant
to methods approved by ISP.
Promulgation of rules is required under the IAPA only where ''specificaliy
authorized by statute."

l.C. § 67-5231(1).

The plain language of LC. § 18-
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8004(4) states that, "(n]otviithstanding any other provision of !aw or ruie of court,"
results of SAC testing ''sha!l be admissible," without the necessity of producing
expert testimony, if the test was "performed by a laboratory operated or
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the

Idaho state police."
requires ISP
approving

to

the

(Emphasis added).

Nothing in this statute authorizes or

comply with the ru!emaking requirements of the IAPA in
methods

for

determining

an

individual's

breath

alcohol

concentration, nor does the statute make compliance with the IAPA a condition
precedent to the admissibility of BAC test results in a criminal proceeding. To
the contrary, the statute provides that such resuits are admissible if the test was
performed by ''any ... method approved by" ISP.

I.C. § 18-8004(4). Because

Haynes has nevei argued, much less demonstrated, that Trooper Keys failed to
comply with any of the methods set out in the SOPs in administering her breath
test, she has faiied to show any basis foi exclusion of her test results in the
criminal case.
The state recognizes the legislature has, in a related statute, conferred
rulemaking authority upon ISP for purposes of administrative license suspension
proceedings. Specifically, I.C. § 18-8002A provides:
(3) Rulemaking authority of the Idaho state police. The Idaho
state police may, pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code,
prescribe by rule:
(a) What testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under
this section; and
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be
performed to comply with the department's requirements. Any
rules of the Idaho state police shall be in accordance with the
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following: a test for a!cohoi concentration in breath as defined in
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and subsection (1) (e) of this section
wm be valid for the purposes of this section if the breath alcohol
testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state
police in accordance with section 18-8004, Idaho Code, at any time
within ninety (90) days before the evidentiary testing .. ,,
I.C. § 18-8002A(3).

By its plain language, however, the ru:emaking authority

granted by J.C. § 18-8002A does not extend to the approval of methods for
breath alcohol testirig contemplated by I.C. § 18-8004(4). To the contrary, the
statute limits what ISP may prescribe by rule to the determinations of "[w]hat
testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under this section {18-8002A]"
and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to
comply with the department's requirements." The statute also mandates that any
rule so prescribed recognize that, for purposes of the license suspension
provisions of I.C, § 18-8002A, a test for breath alcohol concentration is valid "if
the breath alcohol testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state
police in accordance with section 18-8004." In so doing, the legislature clearly
indicated that the approval of breath testing equipment and methods required
under J.C. § 18-8004 is not itself subject to the rulemaking requirements of the

IAPA.
Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not require that ISP approve SAC testing
methods by formal rulemaking.

Therefore, Haynes' argument that the SOPs

were not adopted pursuant to the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA is
irrelevant to the admissibility of her breath test results under this section.
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2.

If ISP's Creation Of The SOPs Is Agenc Action Governed 8~ The
Beauirements Of The IAPA
a n s' Exclusive Means For
Challen in
Such Actio
Was Throu
The Juct·,da\
eview
Provisions Of The IAPA

Haynes argues that, because administrntive license suspension hearings
"held per I.C. § 18-8002.A. are agency action contro!!ed by [the iAPA]," iSP's
approva! of methods for BAC testing for purposes of admissibility of test results

under LC. § 18-8004(4) must also be "agency action falling under the
requirements of [the IAPA]." (Appellant's brief, p.29.) For the reasons set forth
in Section 111.0.1, supra, Haynes has failed to show that ISP's compliance or lack
thereof with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA is at all relevant to
the determination of the admissibility of her breath test results under LC. § 188004(4 ).

If Haynes is correct, however - and ISP's approval of BAC testing

methods for purposes of LC. § 18-8004(4) is agency action governed by the
lAPA - Haynes had no standing to bring, and neither the lower courts nor this
Court have no jurisdiction to consider, a challenge to the manner in which ISP
approved BAG testing methods as a basis for excluding the breath test result in

the criminal case.
"Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless
expressly authorized by statute." Lau h v. Idaho De . of Trans ., 149 Idaho

867, 870, 243 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2010) (citing I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1)); Johnson v.
State, 153 Idaho 246,250,280 P.3d 749, 753 (2012) (same). Idaho Code§ 675270 permits judicial review of final agency actions, including the failure of an
agency to "issue a rule" or "to perform, any duty placed on it by law." See 1.C. §
67-5201 (3) (definition of "Agency action·); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 871, 243 P.3d at
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1059 (summarizing "types of agency actions that could be reviewed by a court").
However, in order to be entitled to such review, the "person aggrieved by final

agency action'' must comply with the procedural requirements of LC. §§ 67-5271
through 67-5279. LC.§ 67-5270{2); BV Severa e Co .. LLC v. State, 155 Idaho
624, 627, 315 P.3d 812, 815 (2013); Lau ,hy, 149 Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at
1058.

Where, as here, the aggrieved person is challenging the validity of a

"rule," compliance with the procedurai requirements necessary to obtain judicial
review requires the person to, among other things: exhaust all availabie
administrative remedies (I.C. § 67-5271), institute proceedings for review or
declaratory judgment by filing a petition in the district court of the county in which
the final agency action was taken or where the aggrieved person resides (I.C. §
67-5272(1)), file the petition within two years of the adoption of the rule being
challenged (LC. §§ 67-5231 and 67-5273), and make the agency a party to the
action (I.C. § 67-5278}.

Haynes did not comply with any of these procedural

requirements, nor could she ever have done so in the criminal case.
From the beginning of this case, Haynes has sought a judicial ruling
invalidating the SOPs for BAC testing based on ISP's failure to have complied
with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the testing
methods contained in the SOPs.

But Haynes he;self did not comply with the
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judicial review provisions of the IAPA.

To the state's knowledge, she did not

attempt to pursue any available administrative remedies.

7

I.C. § 67-5271. Nor

did she "institute~ any "proceedings foi review or declaratory judgment" by filing a
timeiy petition in the district court of the appropriate county and naming iSP as a
party to the action.

LC. §§ 67-5272, 67-5273, 67-5278.

Instead, Haynes has

attempted to have the SOPs invalidated as a basis for excluding her breath test
result in the criminal case. Nothing in the IAPA or in any other statute, including
I.C. § 18-8004, enables Haynes to challenge the validity of lSP's action in this
forum and in this manner.

Haynes' attempt to do so is, in her own words,

nothing more than an attempt to make "an end-run around the requirements" of
the IAPA. (Appellant's brief, p.25.)
Because there is no statute that authorizes Haynes to raise ISP's alleged
noncompliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA as a defense in the
ciiminal case, Haynes lacked standing to bring the challenge and both the lower
courts and this Court are without jurisdiction to consider it.

See b.fil!9.QY, 149

7

The state confesses is not aware of any specific administrative remedy by
which Haynes could challenge the validity of ISP's adoption of the SOPs and
methods for BAC testing contained therein. Although i.C. § 18-8002A(7) allows
for an administrative hearing when a person's driver's license has been
suspended as a result of failing a BAG test, failure of ISP to comply with the
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the methods for BAC testing is
not one of the grounds upon which the license suspension may be vacated. In
addition, I.C. § 67-5278 appears to contemplate that the validity of an agency
rule may be challenged in an action for declaratory judgment, without the
necessity of exhausting administrative remedies. See also Asarco. Inc. v. State,
138 Idaho 719, 69 P.3d 139 (2003) (mining companies did not have to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of validity of state
agency's action in issuing a total maximum daily load limit without complying with
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA).
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Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at 1058 ("Without an enabfing statute, the distrlct court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction" to review agency action.). If the IAPA applies to
!SP's actions in approving methods for breath testing, lt also applies to bar
Haynes' attempt to chaHenge those actions in the criminal case.

3.

The legislature has given ISP authority to prescribe by rule "[w]hat testing
is required to complete evidentiary testing" for alcohol concentration under I.C. §
18-8002A and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be
performed to comply with the department's requirements." I.C. § 18-8002(3)(a),

(b).

Pursuant to this authority, ISP has promulgated administrative "Rules

Governing Alcohol Testing." See Idaho Administrative Code (IDAPA) 11.03.01,

et seq.

Relevant to this appeal is !DAPA 11.03.01.14.03, which governs the

administration of breath alcohol testing. Specifically, the rule provides:

03.

Administration. Breath tests shall be administered

in conformity with standards established by the department.
Standards shall be developed for each type of breath testing
instrument used in Idaho, and such standards shall be issued in the
form of analytical methods and standard operating procedures.

IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03. Pursuant to its plain language - and consistent with the
requirements of LC. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8004{4) - this rule leaves to ISP the
task of developing standards for the administration of breath tests and of issuing
such standards "in the form of anaiytical methods and standard operating
procedures.'' Nowhere in this rule or in the legislative mandate of I.C. §§ 18-
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8002A and 18-8004(4} is there any requirement that the SOPs themse,ves be
estabUshed as rules in compliance with the IAPA.
On

appeal,

Haynes

does

not

challenge

the

vaiidity

of

IDAPA

11.03.01 .14.03 or contend that that rule, which expressly authorizes iSP to
establish methods for breath testing and issue them in the form of SOPs, was
improperiy promulgated. Instead, she argues that the SOPs themselves meet

the legal definition of an agency urule" and, therefore, compliance with the formal
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA was requiied. (Appellant's brief, pp.25-31.)
For ihe reasons set forth in Sections 111.0.1 and 111.0.2, supra, this Court should
decline to entertain the merits of Haynes' argument.

Even if this Court does

consider Haynes' challenge to the validity of ISP's action in adopting the SOPs
without engaging in formal rulemaking beyond that which occurred in adopting
IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03, the challenge fails because the SOPs are not agency
"rules" under the applicable law.
An agency action is a rule only where the action in question meets all of
six characteristics. Asarco. Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723, 69 P.3d 139, 143
(2003). Those characteristics include that the action in question "prescribes a
legal standard or directive not otherwise provided by the enabling statute,·
"expresses agency policy not previously expressed," and "is an interpretation of

law or general policy." .IQ.; see also I.C. § 67-5201(19) (definition of "Rule"}.
Where an agency merely carries forth its assigned task without creating
additional legal requirements or interpreting la 1.v or genera! policy it does not
create rules subject to the procedures of the !APA See Sons and Daughters of
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Idaho Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Comm'n., 142 Idaho 659, 663-64, 132 P.3d 416, 42021 (2006) (Gaming Update not a rule where it did not prescribe a legal standard
but merely explained existing rules); Jdaho State Tax Comm'n v. Beacom, i31
Idaho 569, 570-72, 961 P.2d 660, 661-63 (1998) (adoption of tax form to carry
out required function of self-reporting taxes not rulemaking function).
Applying the above principles, the Idaho Court of Appeals has al;eady
conciuded that the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA do "not apply when the
Idaho state police approves the methods for determining an individual's alcohol
concentration." State v. Alford, 139 Idaho 595, 597, 83 P.3d 139, 141 (Ct. App.
2004) (emphasis added).

In Alford, the defendant sought to exclude his BAC

test result on the basis that ISP did not comply with the rulemaking requirements
of the IAPA when it approved the use of the Alco-Sensor 111, the breath-testing
device used in Alford's case.

kl, at 597-98, 83 P.3d at 141-42. Citing the

characteristics of agency rules identified by the Idaho Supreme Court in Asarco,

supra, the Court of Appeals determined "the Idaho state police action approving
the use of the Alco-Sensor 111 was not rulemaking" because it neither prescribed
any new legal standard or agency policy nor interpreted any law.

!fl

The court

reasoned:
The DUI statute already prescribes the legal standard limiting an
individual's alcohol concentration. Alford has failed to demonstrate
that any Idaho state police polrcy was expressed, or that any law or
policy was interpreted, by the approval of the Alco-Sensor Iii.
Instead, the Idaho state police properly carried out a statutory duty
to authorize the use of certain breath-testing equipment by law
enforcement agencies. In doing so, it identified equipment that it
found to be suitable for such purpose. It did not create additional
legal requirements. Thus, the state was not required to provide
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evidence of Idaho state police compliance v1ith iAPA in approving
the use of the Alco-Sensor II!

Id. at 598, 83 P.3d at 142.
Haynes has not even cited Alfqrd; much less attempted to distinguish it.
Nor can she, just as the approval of breath-testing equipment is not rulemaking,
neither is the approval of methods to conduct such testing according to the
standards of I.C. § 18-8004(4). As correctly obseNed by·the Court of Appeals in
A!ford, I.C. § 18-8004 "already prescribes the iegal standard limiting

an

individual's alcohol concentration.· Alford, 139 Idaho at 598, 83 P.3d at 142.
The methods for BAC testing set forth in the SOPs do not prescribe any new
legal standard for DUI, nor do they interpret any existing law or policy. To the
contrary, the state police action in adopting the SOPs was merely the carrying
out of the legislative directive to approve methods for BAC testing pursuant to
the statute. While compliance with the methods so approved is a prerequisite to
the admissibility of breath test results in the absence of expert tesiimony, this
legal requirement exists by virtue of the enabling statute itself, see I.C. § 188004(4), not because of any action on the part of ISP.
The methods for BAC testing set forth in the SOPs do not create any
binding law or policy; they are merely procedural standards that, if followed by
law enforcement, permit a BAC test result to be introduced in a criminal
proceeding with the necessity of expert testimony pursuant to I.C, § 18-8004(4).
Because the SOPs do not themselves prescribe or inteipret any law, they are not
"rules" to which the formal rulemaking requirements of the !APA apply. Haynes'
arguments to the contrary are without merit and do not establish any basis for
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COMES NOW. the State of Idaho. Plaintiff-Appellant, by and through its

authorized representative, the Attorney Genera! of the State of Idaho, and pursuant to
Rule 32(b), LA R., hereby moves this Court for an order dismissing, with prejudice, the
State's appeal in this case.
DATED this 16th day of October. 2015.
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